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Strict in Theory,
But Accommodating in Fact?
Ozan 0. Varol*
ABSTRACT
As law students quickly learn, the strict-scrutiny test governs challenges
under the Equal Protection Clause to the government's use of suspect
classifications and infringement on certain fundamental rights. To survive
strict scrutiny, the government bears the heavy burden of showing a
compelling interest in drawing a suspect classification or infringing on a
fundamental right and narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest. Over
the years, strict scrutiny has expanded to serve as a bulwark against
government intrusions on many fundamental rights and liberties in the United
States Constitution - including the right to vote, marry, access the courts, and
freedom of speech and association. At times, the United States Supreme
Court was so demanding of the government in its application ofstrict scrutiny
that no government action seemed capable of meeting its demands. This
prompted the Supreme Court justices to counter, in at least eleven individual
and majority opinions, that strict scrutiny was not "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact." So long as the government met its burden - albeit a highly
demanding one - the Court would uphold the government action as
constitutional.
But times have changed Strict scrutiny is strict no more. In its attempt
to remedy the perceived rigidity of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court
overcorrected. The pendulum has now swung in the opposite direction. In a
recent line of Supreme Court decisions, justices in majority and dissenting
opinions have diluted the strict-scrutiny test with a strong dose of deference
to the government. Out of these decisions emerges a test that is strict in
theory, but accommodating in fact.
This Article is an analysis and critique of deferential strict scrutiny. The
Article reveals inconsistencies in the Court's use of run-of-the-mill strict
scrutiny and deferential strict scrutiny, which have left government actors
uncertain about the constitutionality of their conduct and the lower courts in
a quandary as to which version of strict scrutiny to apply and when. The
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Article argues that, if unconstrained, this newly minted version of strict
scrutiny - which allows the government to avoid an exacting constitutional
inquiry - puts at risk the very liberties that strict scrutiny was designed to
protect.
1. INTRODUCTION
The origins of the strict-scrutiny test have been the subject of much aca-
demic debate.' According to some accounts, the roots of the test can be
traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States, a wide-
ly criticized opinion that upheld the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War 11.2 In that case, the Court held that "the most rigid scrutiny"
would govern all challenges under the Equal Protection Clause to the gov-
ernment's classification of individuals according to their race.4 Analyzing the
equal-protection challenge in a highly deferential manner to the government,5
the Court held that the government's interest in preventing espionage and
sabotage by the Japanese justified its internment of Japanese Americans dur-
1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1275 (2007) ("[T]he modem [strict-scrutiny] formula evolved simultaneously
in a number of doctrinal areas . . . ."); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and
Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 (2000) ("[T]he formal concept of strict scrutiny developed in
the area of equal protection . . . ."); Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling
State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 357 (2006) (ar-
guing that the strict-scrutiny test first appeared in the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 798
(2006) ("[T]he strict scrutiny standard was first suggested by implication in the fam-
ous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products.").
2. 323 U.S. 214, 216, 219 (1944); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
strict-scrutiny test "was first enunciated in Korematsu"); Fallon, supra note 1, at 1276
(stating that Korematsu "included language that can be seen as anticipating what we
would now call strict scrutiny").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
4. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny."). The Korematsu Court's formulation of the "most rigid scrutiny" test
did not include the compelling-interest and narrowly-tailored-means elements that
comprise the current strict-scrutiny test. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1274. The Court
developed the modem formulation of the test in the 1960s. Id. at 1283.
5. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 382 ("Although [the Korematsu Court] intimated
a heightened state interest requirement for racial classifications, [the Court] entirely
deferred to the government's assertion that it was met.").
1244 [Vol. 75
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ing wartime.6 Justice Murphy vehemently dissented from the Court's "legali-
zation of racism" under the auspices of heightened scrutiny.
Since Korematsu, the Court expanded the use of strict scrutiny from its
application in the context of racial classifications. In the Equal Protection
Clause context, strict scrutiny now also governs classifications on the basis of
national origin and state classifications on the basis of alienage. 9 In addition,
strict scrutiny applies to infringements on certain fundamental rightso under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses - including the right to mar-
ry, to control the upbringing of one's children,12 to vote, to access the
courts,14 and to travel within the United States.1s Governmental infringe-
ments on the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of
association also are subject to strict scrutiny.
To survive strict scrutiny, the government bears the heavy burden of sa-
tisfying two elements: one relating to the government's ends and the other to
its means.' 7 As to its ends, the government must show a compelling interest
in drawing a suspect classification or infringing on a fundamental right. 1 As
to its means, the government must prove that it adopted narrowly tailored
6. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
7. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
8. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
9. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 602 (1976). There are some exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny
to alienage classifications, such as state classifications related to self-government and
the democratic process and congressionally approved alienage classifications. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 743-46 (2d ed.
2002) (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (self-government and dem-
ocratic process); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (congressionally approved
classifications)).
10. Adam Winkler has shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, infringe-
ments on only some - not all - fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. See
generally Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 227 (2006).
11. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
12. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
13. See generally Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
15. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
16. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972)
(freedom of speech); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (freedom of
association).
17. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 506 n.1 (2005) ("We put the bur-
den on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.").
18. Id. at 505.
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means to achieve that compelling interest.'9 A government action subject to
strict scrutiny is unconstitutional if it fails either element of this test.20
Strict scrutiny, by definition, is strict - and for good reason. For exam-
ple, for racial classifications, the test is intended "to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race" by the government.21 The test presumes that whenever the gov-
ernment classifies persons according to their race, its decisions are inherently
22
suspect. To serve its inquisitorial function, the test cannot accept blank
assertions by the government for why it needs to use race in its decision-
making. Rather, through the strict-scrutiny test, the courts ensure that 'the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a high-
ly suspect tool."' 2  The reason for this searching inquiry, no doubt, is the
wound that government-sanctioned racial discrimination has inflicted on this
24
nation throughout its history. When our government classifies us by race,
19. Id.
20. Id. Most government actions are not subject to strict scrutiny. For example,
the intermediate-scrutiny test governs government classifications on the basis of
gender and government discriminations against children born out of wedlock. See
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (gender); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (children born out of wedlock). That test requires
the government to show an "important" government interest and means "substantially
related" to the achievement of that interest. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). All other classifications under the Equal Protection Clause are subject to
rational-basis review. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440-42 (1985). Under the deferential rational-basis test, "legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 440.
21. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
22. Id.; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("The reasons for strict
scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated
by an invidious purpose.").
23. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. at 493); see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996) (arguing that the strict-
scrutiny test "ensure[s] that courts are most skeptical in cases in which it is highly
predictable that illegitimate motives are at work").
24. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1196 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) ("Because of our country's
struggle with racial division and the injustices of compelled government dejure se-
gregation, we must be especially suspicious of any compulsive government program
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courts ordinarily assume foul play is at work and put the government to its
burden to show why its action must be upheld.2 5
At times, the Supreme Court has been so demanding in its application of
the strict-scrutiny test that commentators questioned if any government action
could survive the test.26 This prompted the Supreme Court justices to counter
- in at least eleven individual and majority opinions - that strict scrutiny is
not "'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 27 So long as the government satisfied
its burden under strict scrutiny - albeit a highly demanding one - the Court
would uphold the government action as constitutional.
But times have changed. At least in certain contexts, strict scrutiny is
strict no more. In its attempt to remedy the perceived rigidity of the strict-
scrutiny test,28 the Supreme Court overcorrected. The pendulum has now
swung in the opposite direction. In majority and dissenting opinions in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, ' Johnson v. California,30 and Parents Involved in Communi-
ty Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1," the Supreme Court diluted the
strict-scrutiny test with a strong dose of deference 32 to the government, creat-
25. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) ("It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.").
26. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (arguing
that the Court's use of strict scrutiny in some cases was "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact").
27. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
833 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005);
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1031
(2003) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 237; Missouri
v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166
n.17 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. The rigidity of the strict-scrutiny test was "perceived," because, according to
an empirical study by Adam Winkler, the test never was as fatal as scholars thought.
See generally Winkler, supra note 1. Professor Winkler's study of federal-court deci-
sions between 1990 and 2003 shows that the challenged laws survived strict scrutiny
30 percent of the time - a percentage "high enough to conclude that in the aggregate
strict scrutiny is not inevitably, or even in the overwhelming number of cases, fatal in
fact." Id. at 812-13.
29. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
31. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
32. In this Article, I employ Robert Schapiro's definition of judicial deference:
"Judicial deference acknowledges that, based on the interpretation of another branch
of government, a court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would oth-
5
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ing a deferential version of strict scrutiny that bears no resemblance to its
original form. Out of these decisions emerges a test that is strict in theory, but
accommodating in fact.
This Article is an analysis and critique of deferential strict scrutiny. The
Article reveals inconsistencies in the Court's use of run-of-the-mill strict
scrutiny and deferential strict scrutiny, which have left government actors
uncertain about the constitutionality of their conduct and the lower courts in a
quandary as to which version of strict scrutiny to apply and when. The Ar-
ticle argues that, if unconstrained, this newly minted version of strict scrutiny
- which allows the government to avoid an exacting constitutional inquiry -
puts at risk the very liberties that strict scrutiny was designed to protect.
In Part 1I, the Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter
v. Bollinger. Grutter concerned an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the
University of Michigan Law School's use of race in its admissions deci-
34
sions. The Court upheld the law school's admissions criteria and, in so
doing, deferred to the law school on the questions of whether its stated inter-
est in achieving diversity was compelling and whether its admissions criteria
was narrowly tailored. Part III argues that Grutter's reasoning was faulty
and that its deference to the law school cannot be justified under any of the
rationales asserted by the majority. It explores the bounds of Grutter's defe-
rence, concluding that Grutter may have created a dangerous precedent of
deferential strict scrutiny that may extend far beyond the confines of higher
education.
The remaining sections of the Article contrast Grutter's deferential
analysis to other cases from the Supreme Court's equal-protection jurispru-
dence. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's non-deferential analysis in
United States v. Virginia, which addressed an equal-protection challenge to
the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute, another
higher-education institution.36 Part V contrasts Grutter to Johnson v. Cali-
fornia, where the Court refused to defer to prison officials in an equal-
protection challenge to a prison policy requiring the segregation of inmates
according to their race to prevent violence.37 Part VI analyzes Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, where the
Court struck down two school districts' student-assignment plans that relied
on race to determine which public schools the students could attend.38 Al-
erwise reach." Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy
in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000). For a
thorough analysis of the use of deference in constitutional law, see generally Paul
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008).
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
34. Id. at 316-17.
35. Id at 328-29.
36. 518 U.S. 515, 520-21, 523 (1996).
37. 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
38. See generally 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
1248 [Vol. 75
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/4
20101 STRICTIN THEORY, BUTACCOMMODATING IN FACT? 1249
though the four-justice plurality in Parents Involved attempted to confine
Grutter's deference to the context of higher-education institutions, five justic-
es extended at least part of Grutter's holding to K-12 schools.39 With this
extension, Part VI argues, deferential strict scrutiny has gained momentum
and will be invoked in future Supreme Court opinions.
II. GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER AND DEFERENTIAL STRICT SCRUTINY
Grutter v. Bollinger was a class-action case against the University of
Michigan Law School challenging the law school's use of race in its admis-
sions criteria.40 The plaintiffs asserted that race was the predominant factor
in the law school's admissions policy, which put non-minority applicants at a
significant disadvantage in the application process.41 This, the plaintiffs con-
tended, constituted state-sanctioned racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The law school
countered that it used race as one of many factors in its decision-making
process, which it asserted was narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling
interest in recruitin a "critical mass" of minority students to construct a di-
verse student body.
The district court applied strict scrutiny and held that the law school's
race-based admissions criterion was unconstitutional.44 The court reasoned
that the attainment of a racially diverse student body was not a compelling
state interest and, even if such interest were compelling, the law school had
not used narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest. 45
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court.46 The Sixth Circuit held
that achieving a diverse student body was a compelling interest under binding
Supreme Court precedent and that the law school's use of race as a "potential
plus factor" in its admissions criteria was narrowly tailored to serve that in-
terest.47
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit. 48 The Court purported to apply strict scrutiny to the law school's use
of race in its admissions decisions, noting that the policy would survive the
constitutional challenge only if the race-based classification was "narrowly
tailored to further compelling governmental interests. 49 In describing the
39. See infra Part VI (discussing Parents Involved).
40. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 316.
44. Id. at 321.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 343-44.
49. Id. at 326.
7
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strict-scrutiny test, the Court emphasized that the test is intended to "'smoke
out illegitimate uses of race',,50 and that the determination of the admissions
policy's constitutionality is "'the job of the court,"' not of the law school.5'
But the Court failed to note, perhaps deliberately, that the law school would
bear the burden of satisfying the requirements of strict scrutiny.
The Court first discussed whether the law school's stated interest in the
educational benefits that flow from diversity was a compelling state interest.52
On this point, the Court held that "[t]he Law School's educational judgment
that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer."5 3 Despite this deference, the Court reassured its skeptics that its scru-
tiny would be "no less strict." 54
The Court explained that it would defer to the law school because "con-
text matters" in the Court's equal-protection analysis.55 In other words, al-
though all race-based classifications are suspect under the Equal Protection
Clause, some racial classifications, depending on their context, are more sus-
pect than others. Race-based classifications in the higher-education context,
according to the Court, are less suspect than in other contexts because "uni-
versities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."56 Citing Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the
Court noted that universities enjoy educational autonomy under the First
Amendment.5 7 The decision of whom to admit to a university requires "com-
plex educational judgments .. . primarily within the expertise of the universi-
58ty," warranting deference by the courts.
Despite this broad rhetoric about deference to the law school, the Court
also examined the amicus briefs and expert studies in the record, concluding
that the record supported the law school's educational judgment about the
benefits of diversity.59 According to the Court, the record demonstrated that
50. Id (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989)).
51. Id. at 327 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 230
(1995)).
52. Id. at 327-33.
53. Id. at 328.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 327.
56. Id. at 329 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
57. Id. ("'The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body."' (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978))).
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. at 330. The existence of evidence supporting the importance of diversity
in law schools makes the Court's deference to the law school all the more unjustifia-
1250 [Vol. 75
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diversity "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial
stereotypes," enables livelier classroom discussion, and exposes students to a
broad array of viewpoints. 60 These theoretical benefits of diversity had prac-
tical support from amicus briefs filed in support of the law school by major
American businesses, high-ranking retired military officers and civilian lead-
ers, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps ("ROTC"), all of whom asserted
that student body diversity leads to many benefits in the work force.6 1 Be-
cause universities - and especially law schools - were training arenas for the
nation's future leaders, diversity in legal education contributed to the creation
of leaders from diverse backgrounds.6
Next, the Court analyzed whether the means that the law school adopted
were narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interest in diversity. 63 The
Court began its narrow-tailoring analysis by reiterating - reminiscent of the
Queen's "The lady protests too much, methinks" remark from Hamlet6 - that
it was not "'abandon[ing] strict scrutiny."' 65 The Court went on to hold that
the law school's admissions policy bore "the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored
plan."66 Instead of using a quota system that reserved a certain number of
seats for minority students, which would have been clearly unconstitutional,
the law school engaged in an individualized consideration of all candidates,
with race or ethnicity playing a role only as a potential plus factor. The law
school also gave "substantial weight" to non-racial factors, such as "'em-
ployment experience, nonacademic performance, or personal background,"'
ble. If such evidence existed in the record, the Court could have reached the same
conclusion through its independent analysis, not via deference to the law school.
60. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D. Mich.
2001)).
61. Id. at 330-31; see, e.g., Brief for 3M et. al as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellants Seeking Reversal at *5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241),
2001 WL 34624918; Brief of General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at *3-4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL
399096.
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
63. Id. at 333.
64. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 254 (Horace Howard Furness ed., J.B.
Lippincott Co. 1905) (1877).
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion).
66. Id.
67. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding unconstitu-
tional the admissions policy of the University of Michigan's College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts because the College assigned a fixed number of points on the
basis of the minority status of an applicant and did not provide sufficient individual
consideration).
68. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
9
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which the law school believed contributed to the diversity of its student
body.
The Court rejected the dissent's assertion that the law school's daily
consultation of its minority admission statistics suggested that the law school
maintained a quota system. 70 Rather, the Court accepted, with no scrutiny,
the school officials' testimony that they did not give race more or less weight
because of their constant reference to these statistics.71 The Court also curso-
rily dismissed the dissent's examination of the law school's minority admis-
sion statistics over a period of five years. This data, according to the dissent,
showed a close correlation between the percentage of minority applicants
from a particular minority group and the percentage of admitted applicants
from that group - suggestive of a quota system. 72
Even though the narrowly tailored means prong of strict scrutiny ordina-
rily requires the state to show that it employed the least restrictive means to
achieve its compelling interest,73 the law school was required to consider -
but not required to exhaust - every race-neutral formula for attaining a di-
verse student body.74  If the race-neutral alternatives sacrificed the law
school's elite status or the level of diversity it sought to attain, the law school
could constitutionally use race as a factor in its admissions decisions. 75 As
part of its narrow-tailoring analysis, the Court took the law school "at its
word" that it would end its race-conscious admissions policy as soon as it
found a race-neutral alternative to its liking.76 Deference to the law school's
"word" thus allowed the Court to uphold the law school's admissions policy
as constitutional under strict scrutiny.
III. GRUTTER'S ERRORS
A. Grutter's Deference Is Inconsistent with Strict Scrutiny
By definition, the strict-scrutiny test puts the heavy burden on the gov-
ernment to prove the two prongs of the test. For this reason, the Supreme
Court has held: "[B]lind judicial deference to legislative or executive pro-
nouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis." 77 Even
Justice O'Connor, the author of Grutter, writing for the Court in a later case,
stated: "[D]eference is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection juri-
69. Id. at 338 (quoting Brief for Respondents at *4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241), 2003 WL 402236).
70. Id. at 335.
71. Id. at 335, 338.
72. Id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. See Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
75. Id. at 340.
76. Id. at 343.
77. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
1252 [Vol. 75
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sprudence. We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-
based policies are justified." 78 Most recently, in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, the Court reaffirmed: "This Court is the final arbiter of the question
whether a public university has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we
owe no deference to universities when we consider that question." 79
But the Grutter Court was not faithful to the tenets of the traditional
strict-scrutiny test. The Court failed to place the burden on the law school,
deferred to the law school on both prongs of the strict-scrutiny test, and pre-
sumed "'good faith' on the part of [the law school] . . . absent 'a showing to
the contrary." 80  Justice O'Connor applied this good-faith presumption in
Grutter even though in an earlier case, where the Court struck down a city
plan that required a 30% set aside for minority contractors, she wrote for a
majority of the Court: "Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that
simple legislative assurances of good intentions cannot suffice."a The Grut-
ter Court's presumption of good faith effectively switched the burden from
the law school to the litigants challenging the law school's race-conscious
admissions policy to prove the absence of a compelling state interest and the
absence of narrowly tailored means. This switch all but guaranteed that the
law school's admissions policy would satisfy both prongs of the strict-
scrutiny test.
78. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005). Justice O'Connor's
criticism of deference in Johnson was directed at Justice Thomas, who, in his dissent,
asserted that a "compelling showing [is] needed to overcome the deference we owe to
prison administrators." Id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra Part V for an in-
depth discussion of Johnson v. Calfornia.
79. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010). In Chris-
tian Legal Society, the Court held that a policy of the Hastings College of Law requir-
ing registered student organizations to accept all students as members did not violate
the First Amendment rights of the Christian Legal Society. Id. at 2978. Despite the
Court's purported rejection of deference, the dissent accused the majority of
"[d]eferring broadly to the law school's judgment about the permissible limits of
student debate." Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
80. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("Implicit in the [Grutter]
Court's [narrow-tailoring] analysis was a measure of deference toward the university
."), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
81. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 500. Likewise, Cass Sunstein has noted that the
strict-scrutiny test is based on a "presumption of distrust" and not a "presumption of
good faith," which is ordinarily reserved for rational-basis review. See Sunstein,
supra note 23, at 78.
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1. Compelling-Interest Prong
On the compelling-interest prong, the Court failed to examine whether
diversity was the actual purpose of the law school's race-conscious admis-
sions program and not a post-hoc rationalization for a different, and perhaps
unconstitutional, purpose. Although the Court discussed the benefits that
result from a diverse student body, it failed to inquire whether diversity was
a mere pretext for the law school's use of race in its admissions decisions. If,
for example, the law school had implemented its race-conscious admissions
policy to remedy past societal discrimination against minorities - not to fur-
ther the diversity of its student body - that policy would have been unconsti-
tutional under well-established precedent. 83
Even in the intermediate-scrutiny context, where the government's bur-
den is easier to meet, 84 the Court examines whether the government's justifi-
cation for drawing a classification states "actual [government] purposes, not
rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded."8 5 But the Grutter
Court took the law school "at its word" that attainment of diversity was its
actual purpose.8 6 If the function of strict scrutiny, as the Grutter Court held,
is to "smoke out" unconstitutional uses of race and to "carefully examin[e]
... the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker
for the use of race," 87 the Court cannot perform that function by taking the
government "at its word" as to its actual motives.
A recent Supreme Court opinion, Ricci v. DeStefano, exemplifies the
88Grutter Court's errors on this front. In Ricci, white and Hispanic firefight-
ers sued the City of New Haven, Connecticut, for racial discrimination, alleg-
ing violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, which "prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin."89 The firefighters asserted that the city had
intentionally discriminated against them by discarding the results of a promo-
tional examination, which they had successfully passed, on the basis that
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33.
83. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995)
("'[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy."' (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986))).
84. Intermediate scrutiny applies to quasi-suspect classifications such as gender.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). To meet its burden under inter-
mediate scrutiny, the government must show an "important" government interest and
means "substantially related" to the achievement of that interest. Id.
85. Id. at 535-36.
86. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
87. Id. at 326-27.
88. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
89. Id. at 2664, 2672; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
[Vol. 751254
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white candidates had substantially outperformed minority candidates.9 0 The
city countered that it had discarded the examination, not to discriminate
against the plaintiffs, but to avoid liability under Title VII for implementing a
policy that had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.91
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the city's action consti-
tuted intentional discrimination in violation of Title Vil and granted summary
92judgment to the firefighters. As relevant here, Justice Alito examined in a
separate concurrence whether the city's asserted reason for discarding the test
results - concern for disparate-impact liability - was a mere pretext for an
ulterior motive. 93 In his analysis, Justice Alito went through the district court
record in painstaking detail - to an extent rarely seen in a Supreme Court
case.94 He concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the city's actual
reason for discarding the tests was not potential Title VII disparate-impact
liability but "a simple desire to please a politically important racial constitu-
ency" motivated by the lobbying efforts of a community leader.95
Justice Alito's detailed pretext analysis stands in stark contrast to the
Grutter majority's nonexistent one. Instead of taking the City of New Haven
"at its word" that it discarded the test results to avoid disparate-impact liabili-
ty, Justice Alito properly put the city to its burden. In stark contrast, the
Grutter Court failed to require the law school to meet its full burden. Defe-
rential strict scrutiny in Grutter lifted the law school's burden on the pretext
question, converting what might have been an unconstitutional program into a
constitutional one.
2. Narrowly Tailored Means Prong
On the narrowly tailored means prong, the Grutter Court failed to tho-
roughly inquire whether the law school's stated use of race as a plus factor in
its admissions decisions was, in effect, an unconstitutional quota system.
This too resulted from the Court's deference to and presumption of good faith
on the part of the law school.96 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized
90. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 2664-65, 2681.
93. Id. at 2683-84 (Alito, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 2684-88.
95. Id at 2687-88.
96. The presumption of good faith accorded to higher-education institutions in
Grutter is reminiscent of the deferential analysis professional associations enjoy un-
der antitrust laws. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 773 n.10 (1999)
("'The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. . . . The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation
13
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the Court's failure to engage in a thorough narrow-tailoring analysis, assert-
ing that the close correlation between the percentage of minority applicants
and the percentage of admitted minority students raised the inference of an
unconstitutional quota system.97 Without deference, the burden would have
been on the law school to prove the nonexistence of an unconstitutional quota
system, even absent evidence suggestive of a quota system.98
The Grutter Court also failed to inquire thoroughly as to whether the
law school had considered race-neutral alternatives to its race-conscious ad-
missions policy. The Court did not cite any evidence in the record, whether
in the form of testimony by an admissions officer or minutes from a board
meeting, that the law school had considered and rejected race-neutral alterna-
tives, as it was required to do to satisfy strict scrutiny.99 Instead, the Court
dismissed the race-neutral alternatives proposed by the district court and the
United States as unworkable because they might potentially compromise the
educational mission of the law school. 00 Even if these race-neutral alterna-
tives may have turned out to be impracticable, the Constitution required - as
the Court itself acknowledged - that the law school give "serious, good faith
consideration" to such alternatives. 101 Despite the Court's repeated protests
to the contrary, the narrow-tailoring analysis it employed under the guise of
strict scrutiny was effectively an application of intermediate scrutiny, which
demands means that are only "substantially related" to the achievement of the
governmental objective and not means that require the exhaustion of less
restrictive alternatives.
For these reasons, the dissenting justices criticized the majority's mix of
strict scrutiny and deference. Justice Thomas asserted that "the Constitution
of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently."' (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975))).
97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 383-86 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("For example, in 1995, when 9.7% of the applicant pool was African-American,
9.4% of the admitted class was African-American. By 2000, only 7.5% of the appli-
cant pool was African-American, and 7.3% of the admitted class was African-
American. This correlation is striking.").
98. See id at 390-91.
99. Id. at 339-40 (majority opinion) ("Narrow tailoring does, however, require
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity the university seeks."). A "distinguished committee of legal
scholars" developed the admissions policy that was at issue in Grutter. Brief for
Respondents, supra note 69, at *3. Presumably, these scholars would have created a
record delineating the purposes behind the race-conscious policy and whether or not
they had considered race-neutral alternatives.
100. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
101. Id. at 339; see also Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 978 (2004) ("[I]f [Grutter] means that a gov-
ernment need only consider (but not necessarily adopt) workable, race-neutral alterna-
tives, the standard articulated for narrow tailoring has assumed a surprisingly deferen-
tial posture toward government decision makers.").
1256 [ Vol. 75
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[does not] countenance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the
Law School, an approach inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scruti-
ny."'l02 Likewise, Justice Kennedy noted, "[d]eference is antithetical to strict
scrutiny, not consistent with it." 03
This does not mean, however, that strict scrutiny should be so exacting
as to be "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."1" What the Grutter Court should
have done, but did not do, was: (1) examine whether diversity was the actual
purpose of the law school's race-conscious admissions policy; (2) engage in
the kind of analysis that Chief Justice Rehnquist employed in his dissent to
determine whether the law school's admissions policy constituted an uncons-
titutional quota system; and (3) determine whether the law school had se-
riously considered and rejected race-neutral admissions criteria.
Under this analysis, the law school could have met its burden on all
three issues by presenting evidence in the form of minutes from a board meet-
ing or testimony from school authorities that: (1) the achievement of diversi-
ty, and not an unconstitutional purpose such as remedying past societal dis-
crimination against minorities, was the actual purpose of its admissions poli-
cy; (2) the statistics that the dissent cited were not sufficient to establish the
existence of a quota system; and (3) the law school had adequately re-
searched, seriously considered, and rejected - for constitutionally proper rea-
sons - race-neutral alternatives for constitutionally valid purposes.
This is the type of analysis that strict scrutiny - which should be strict in
theory and strict in fact - required from the Grutter Court.'os The Court
should have drawn its independent conclusions from the evidence, rather than
deferring to the law school's blanket statements. In the end, the Court's in-
dependent conclusions may have been the same as the law school's, but the
Court had the constitutional duty to reach them on its own. 06
102. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
103. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Winkler, supra note 1, at 820
(noting that Grutter was an example of "strict scrutiny schizophrenia" because the
Grutter Court "pledge[d] adherence to both deference and skeptical scrutiny").
104. See cases cited supra note 27; see also Winkler, supra note 1, at 805 ("A
strict scrutiny that is always fatal cannot serve to smoke out illegitimate motives; such
a rule effectively sets fire to the laws themselves, invalidating them regardless of
motive.").
105. Indeed, Adam Winkler's empirical study of federal-court decisions between
1990 and 2003 shattered the familiar adage that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact. See
Winkler, supra note 1; see also supra note 28 (discussing Professor Winkler's study).
Strict scrutiny, before Grutter was decided in 2003, had been strict in theory, but
"survivable in fact." See Winkler, supra note 1, at 796.
106. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
15
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B. Grutter Erroneously Deferred to the Judgment of the Law School
on a Legal Question
What made the Grutter Court's deference all the more unjustifiable was
its deference to the law school on a legal question.i0 7 Assume, as the Court
did, that complex educational judgments lie beyond the purview of the judi-
ciary, necessitating deference to universities' educational policies. In that
case, deference would be proper to specific educational policies implemented
using constitutional means to meet constitutional ends. For example, were
the law school to implement a minimum GPA or LSAT score requirement for
admissions and were this requirement challenged as discriminatory under the
Equal Protection Clause, deference to the law school's educational judgment
would be proper. Minimum GPA and LSAT score requirements, unlike race,
are not suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. 0 8  The
Court need not second-guess a particular educational policy or substitute its
judgment for that of university officials, so long as the university acts within
the bounds of the Constitution.
Described in this way, deference to a university's educational judgment
is similar to deference to a board of directors' business judgment in the cor-
porate-law context. When a stockholder challenges a board of directors'
business decision, a presumption applies - dubbed the business-judgment rule
- that the directors made a fair and impartial decision in the best interests of
the corporation.109 In other words, courts defer to the board of directors on
107. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("The [Grutter] Court largely deferred to the law
school's educational judgment not only in determining that diversity would produce
these benefits, but also in determining that these benefits were critical to the school's
educational mission."), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); see id. at 1173 n.13 ("The [Grut-
ter] Court also heeded the judgment of amici curiae - including educators, business
leaders and the military - that the educational benefits that flow from diversity consti-
tute a compelling interest."); Paul J. Beard II, The Legacy of Grutter: How the Mere-
dith and Pies Courts Wrongly Extended the "Educational Benefits" Exception to the
Equal Protection Clause in Public Higher Education, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 9
(2006) ("For the Court, obtaining the educational benefits flowing from a racially
diverse student body was compelling because the University of Michigan Law School
said so."); Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and
Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1700 (2004) ("Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis [in Grutter] is clearly one of deferring to the defendants on a legal question.").
108. A claim that a minimum GPA or LSAT score requirement imposes a dispa-
rate impact on minorities would not, in and of itself, suffice to hold the requirement
unconstitutional. Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, a showing of
discriminatory purpose also would be required. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 240 (1976).
109. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927-28 (Del. 2003).
The Delaware Supreme Court explained the business-judgment rule as follows:
1258 [Vol. 75
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any business decision they make, absent evidence of conflict of interest or
bad faith, because the board of directors knows how to manage a corporation
better than a court.110 While courts defer to the board of directors on the
question whether its business decisions are in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, they do not defer to corporations on the question whether those deci-
sions are lawful."'1 A decision by the board of directors to discriminate on
the basis of race in hiring, for example, would violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. A court would not defer to the board of directors' "business
judgment" that such policy is lawful under Title VII.
And so was the case in Ricci. There, the city refused to certify the re-
sults of its firefighter promotion examination, believing that certification
would expose it to Title VII liability for disparate impact. But the Supreme
Court refused to defer to the city's legal determination on this question. Far
from showing any deference to the city, the Court held that the city "must
have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-
impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action."11 3
But the Grutter Court did precisely what the Ricci Court declined to do.
Grutter did not merely defer to which constitutional course of conduct the law
school chose to achieve a constitutional objective. Instead, the Court deferred
to the law school on the questions whether the law school's objective was
constitutional and whether the means the law school adopted to achieve that
objective were constitutional.' 14 These are both legal questions." 5 Deference
The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company. An application of the traditional business judgment rule
places the burden on the party challenging the [board's] decision to estab-
lish facts rebutting the presumption.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
110. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Omni-
care, 818 A.2d at 928 ("The business judgment rule embodies the deference that is
accorded to managerial decisions of a board of directors. Under normal circums-
tances, neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the managerial
decision of the directors." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111. See, e.g., W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985) ("Even in
cases involving public safety, the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] plainly
does not permit the trier of fact to give complete deference to the employer's deci-
sion.").
112. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
113. Id. at 2677 (emphasis added).
114. As Pamela Karlan explains:
Nowhere in its [decisions before Grutter] had the Court delegated respon-
sibility for deciding the weight of a governmental interest to some other
governmental entity. ... What is striking [in Grutter] is not that the Court
thinks racial diversity within the student body of a selective public educa-
tional institution can be a compelling governmental purpose, but rather
17
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to the law school on these questions is no different from deference to a board
of directors' statement that its policy of hiring employees of only a particular
race is lawful under Title Vll. That policy would violate Title VII regardless
of the board's belief as to its legality and regardless of the reasons for the
policy's adoption. For example, in Ricci, the Court held that the City of New
Haven's decision to scrap its firefighter promotion exams violated Title VII
even though the city believed - incorrectly - that the certification of its pro-
motion exams would violate Title VII.116 The Ricci Court refused to defer to
the city on the legality of its policy.117
In addition, in a recent case that implicated national security and foreign
affairs, the Supreme Court refused to defer to the government's interpretation
that it declares that racial diversity is compelling because a school thinks
it is.
Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as
Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2007); see also Michelle
Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 943 (2008) ("[T]he
Grutter Court applied a deferential brand of strict scrutiny review, deferring to the
Law School on both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis."). But see F. Andrew Hes-
sick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447,
1449 (2010) (arguing that federal courts "have largely refused to defer [to the legisla-
ture] on questions of constitutional interpretation").
115. The Grutter Court's deference to the law school seems, on its surface, similar
to judicial deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes under the
Chevron doctrine. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). After all, both the interpretation of the Constitution and the
interpretation of a statute are legal questions. But there are two important differences
between the two contexts that justify the use of Chevron deference, but the rejection
of Grutter deference. First, the Chevron doctrine is based primarily upon Congress's
delegation of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies. See United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that the Chevron doctrine applies
"when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority"); Horwitz, supra note 32, at 1080
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44). In other words, courts defer to agency interpre-
tations of statutes mainly because agencies are charged with implementing those same
statutes. In contrast, law schools are not charged with implementing or administering
the Constitution. Neither has the Supreme Court delegated to law schools its authori-
ty of constitutional interpretation. Second, deference under Chevron is relatively li-
mited; courts may defer to agency interpretations of statutes only where (1) the statute
is ambiguous and (2) the agency interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843-44. And the court - not the agency - makes both of these determinations. See
id. Further, "in reviewing agency policy determinations, courts have continued to
apply a 'hard look' doctrine that involves close judicial scrutiny." Schapiro, supra
note 32, at 682. The courts' active scrutiny of agency decisions stands in stark con-
trast to the expansive deference that the Grutter Court afforded to the law school.
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of the constitutional provision at issue. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a
federal statute prohibiting "the provision of 'material support or resources' to
certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity."1 18 In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the statute, the Court expressly denounced any
deference to Congress's interpretation of the First Amendment: "Our prece-
dents, old and new, make clear that concerns of national security and foreign
relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role. We do not defer to the
Government's reading of the First Amendment, even when such interests are
at stake."ll 9 Where other public entities are bound by the Constitution, public
universities should not be awarded a get-out-of-jail-free card via deference.12
This does not mean, however, that deference to public universities
should be banished from constitutional analysis. As explained above, the law
school's educational judgment would have deserved deference had the law
school, for example, implemented minimum GPA or LSAT score require-
ments or picked one particular race-neutral admissions policy over another to
further its interest in diversity. In those cases, the university is exercising its
judgment as to what constitutes appropriate educational policy while remain-
ing within the bounds of the Constitution. But when the issue concerns the
constitutionality of a suspect classification (e.g., race) that appears on the face
of an admissions policy, deference to a non-judicial body likely biased toward
the legality of its own actions is improper - especially under strict scrutiny.121
The Grutter Court's deference did not end there. Not only did the Court
defer to the law school on the legal question whether diversity is a compelling
interest, the Court also deferred, sub silentio, to the law school's interest in
maintaining its elite status. 122 The law school contended that adopting race-
118. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)).
119. Id. at 2727.
120. Cf Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3008 (2010) (Alito,
J., dissenting) ("[W]hen it comes to the interpretation and application of the right to
free speech, we exercise our own independent judgment. We do not defer to Con-
gress on such matters . . . and there is no reason why we should bow to university
administrators." (citation omitted)).
121. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
765 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It is not up to the school boards - the very
government entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinize - to de-
termine what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Rather, this Court must assess independently the nature of
the interest asserted and the evidence to support it in order to determine whether it
qualifies as compelling under our precedents.").
122. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 356 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The proffered interest that the majority vindicates today,
then, is not simply 'diversity.' Instead the Court upholds the use of racial discrimina-
tion as a tool to advance the Law School's interest in offering a marginally superior
education while maintaining an elite institution."). Had the Court not recognized a
19
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neutral admissions policies - such as using a lottery system or decreasing its
emphasis on LSAT scores or GPA - would undermine its high national rank-
ing.123 The Court accepted this contention on its face, did not examine
whether it had any merit, and neglected the fact that other public law schools
such as Boalt Hall had maintained their elite status while adopting race-
neutral admissions policies.124 In effect, the Court recognized a compelling
state interest in maintaining an elite status by allowing the law school to re-
ject race-neutral alternatives because of the law school's desire to maintain its
prestigious spot in the U.S. News & World Report rankings.125
Grutter's deference to the law school largely was welcomed by the aca-
demia. For example, one commentator praised Grutter's deference to the law
school's legal judgment for creating "mini-Supreme Courts out of higher
education institutions," "shift[ing] the primary policing duties from the courts
to the admissions offices," and "reorganiz[ing] the division of labor between
educational officials and the Court."126
compelling interest in elite status, the law school would have been required to adopt
race-neutral criteria (e.g., decreasing its emphasis on undergraduate GPA and LSAT
scores) that would have sacrificed the law school's high admissions standards and
eventually its elite status. See id. at 340 (majority opinion) (noting that the race-
neutral alternatives of "decreasing the emphasis ... on undergraduate GPA and LSAT
scores" or a "lottery system" "would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the
academic quality of all admitted students, or both" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
123. Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
124. See id.; id. at 366-67 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There-
fore, the Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and
its exclusionary admissions system - it cannot have it both ways.").
126. Annalisa Jabaily, Color Me Colorblind: Deference, Discretion, and Voice in
Higher Education After Grutter, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 515, 526-27 (2008);
see Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1520 (2007) (noting that under a
"strong-form" of deference, "universities would enjoy near-absolute discretion to self-
regulate across a range of academic activities, from hiring and firing, to the selection
of campus speech codes or the restriction of religious speech, to the composition of
the student body based explicitly on considerations of race or gender"); id. at 1542
("[C]ourts should grant universities substantial autonomy to engage in educational
decisions; and they should defer, too, in determining what constitutes an academic
decision."); Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Edu-
cational Judgment: Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding
Principles, As Shown by Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months
Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583, 617 ("It is an honor for college administrators that
the Supreme Court has selected higher education as the one unique community in our
society eligible for such judicial deference."); see also Hessick, supra note 114, at
1451 ("When the legislature has offered an interpretation of the Constitution, courts
should afford some level of deference to that interpretation.").
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I do not view this as an improvement. The "labor" involved in Grutter
was not the making of academic decisions better suited for admissions offic-
es. It was the interpretation of the United States Constitution - which, ever
since Marbury v. Madison, has been "emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department."1 27 If the Court has jealously guarded its responsibil-
ity to interpret the Constitution' 28 and refused to shift it to any other branch of
government, why should universities be granted an exception? The U.S.
Constitution is built on a distrust of all government actors, including public
university officials. This distrust exists especially in the constitutional provi-
sions protecting individual rights (including the Equal Protection Clause),
which place certain subjects beyond the reach of government actors who may
be guided by their own biases or political motives - and not by a desire to
protect constitutional norms. 129 Thus, allowing universities to play a role in
policing the constitutionality of their own actions while the courts take a back
seat amounts to constitutional abdication - not constitutional improvement.130
Taken to its logical extreme, this position could have devastating conse-
quences. After all, it was the Court's "exceedingly deferential" approach to
the military authorities in Korematsu that justified the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II.131 But even within the context of higher
education, a similar danger exists. Once in place, a rule of deference to high-
er-education institutions would apply across the board. The Court would
127. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
128. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (noting
the Court's "command to guard jealously and exercise rarely [its] power to make
constitutional pronouncements").
129. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); Hessick, supra note
114, at 1478 ("[A] legislator may view the Constitution as a tool for accomplishing
desired results - a tool to be negotiated, stretched, or even disregarded, when neces-
sary. Judges do not face equivalent pressures." (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, supra
note 23, at 78 ("'Strict scrutiny' is based on a presumption of distrust, to be rebutted
only in the extreme cases."); Winkler, supra note 1, at 802 ("With laws encroaching
upon [fundamental] rights, the 'ordinary political processes' could not be trusted to
reach constitutionally legitimate results." (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938))).
130. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
766 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("To adopt the dissent's deferential approach
would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities."); Scott A. Moss, Against
"Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in Employment Discrimination
Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5
(2006) (arguing that deference to educational institutions "threatens to leave academia
in an island of civil rights lawlessness").
131. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 382; Massey, supra note 101, at 973-74 (arguing
that the Korematsu Court "employed much of the same method as the Grutter majori-
ty"). See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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defer to all academic decisions by such institutions, regardless whether their
motives are good or bad and whether the consequences of their decisions are
beneficial or harmful. Higher-education institutions easily may abuse the
deference granted to them to define the legality of their own conduct. How-
ever well intentioned the law school's race-conscious admissions policy may
have been, the same benign intentions do not motivate all educational poli-
cies.
Paul Horwitz argues that deference to higher-education institutions on
legal questions is proper in part because "[m]ost academics
... would resist any move by a university to engage in flagrant discrimina-
tion."l32 He further notes that "[a]n effort by a university to engage in open
discrimination . . . would run into [numerous] barriers," including objections
from faculty members, students, and alumni.03 Racial prejudice, according
to Professors Horwitz and Byrne, is "'not an academic value." 34
History begs to differ. In the law-school context, consider the Supreme
Court's 1950 decision in Sweatt v. Painter.135 In that case, Heman Sweatt
was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School solely because
of his African American race.136 Instead of offering integrated legal educa-
tion, the state of Texas offered a separate law school for African Ameri-
cans.'37 But that law school had nowhere near the same stature as the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School in terms of "reputation of the faculty, experience
of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige." 38 Under these circumstances, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the state of Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause and required that Sweatt be admitted to the University of Texas Law
School.139
Although Sweatt was decided sixty years ago, racial prejudice in higher-
education institutions is not a relic of the past. Until 2000, Bob Jones Univer-
sity in South Carolina prohibited interracial dating among its students and
denied admission to applicants who engaged in interracial marriage or dat-
132. Horwitz, supra note 126, at 1543.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter:
Getting Real About the "Four Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929,
941 (2006)).
135. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
136. Id. at 631.
137. Id. at 633.
138. Id. at 634.
139. Id. at 635-36.
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ing. 14 Academic institutions, as these cases show, are no more immune to
prejudice than other government actors.141
Consider also Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1). In Brown I,
the Supreme Court held that segregation of students according to their race
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 Brown
I rightfully refused to defer to educational institutions and local governments
that had segregated students on the basis of race and held that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." 144 The segregationists in that
case had advanced many of the same arguments that the supporters of Grut-
ter's deference now advance.145 They argued for deference to the local au-
thorities' judgments about how best to educate their students.146 They pur-
ported to "advocate only a concept of constitutional law that permits determi-
nations of state and local policy to be made on state and local levels."1 47
What would have happened if the Brown Court countenanced deference to
the local authorities? What if the segregationists in Brown were allowed to
sit as "mini-Supreme Courts,"1 48 sharing the labor of interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause with the United States Supreme Court? The Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson did just that in upholding the constitutionality of
segregated railway cars and holding that "separate but equal" was sufficient
to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.149 In so holding, Plessy accorded "a
large discretion" to the state legislatures.150
140. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983); Bob Jones
University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, CNN.coM, Mar. 4, 2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/03/04/bob.jones/.
141. See also Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 550 (3d Cir. 1980)
("Discrimination against minorities and women in the field of education is as perva-
sive as discrimination in any other area of employment."); Michelle Chase, Gender
Discrimination, Higher Education, and the Seventh Circuit: Balancing Academic
Freedom with Protections Under Title VII, Case Note: Farrell v. Butler University, 22
Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 160 (2007) (noting the misperception "held by judges and
juries that university administrators and faculty, some of America's most educated
citizens, are above sexism or racism"); Moss, supra note 130, at 14-15 (noting the
persistence of gender segregation and inequality in academic institutions).
142. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. Id. at 495.
144. Id.
145. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
774-75 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. Id. (citing Brief for the State of Kansas on Reargument at *14, Brown 1, 347
U.S. 483 (No. 1), 1953 WL 48689).
147. Id. at 775 (quoting Brief for the State of Kansas on Reargument, supra note
146).
148. See Jabaily, supra note 126, at 527.
149. 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896), overruled by Brown !, 347 U.S. 483.
150. Id. at 550.
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Brown I expressly overruled Plessy and did not heed the segregationists'
pleas for deference - and for good reason. But when it came to the imple-
mentation of Brown 1, the Court regrettably added deference to the mix. As a
general matter, when a court finds a government action unconstitutional, that
action is unconstitutional immediately. The government must implement an
immediate remedy to correct its constitutional wrong. But in Brown II, rather
than demanding that states desegregate their schools immediately, the Su-
preme Court allowed them to desegregate only "with all deliberate speed."' 5'
The school authorities could take their time, deliberate, and devise a remedy
to their liking for their very own constitutional wrongs. The Court justified
this departure from constitutional norms by deferring to school authorities
who had "the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these [school-segregation] problems."l 52
Brown 11's deference undermined the historic holding of Brown I and
significantly delayed the desegregation of schools.' 53 Segregationists wel-
comed Brown II as a sign of relief following Brown I's broad constitutional
holding, which recognized the rights of African Americans to attend the
schools of their choice.154 While deference may seem harmless to some in
the context of race-conscious admissions criteria in higher-education institu-
tions, there is no legal basis on which to distinguish the benign deference
accorded to the law school in Grutter and the disastrous deference to the local
authorities in Brown II.
The world of Sweatt and Brown is different from the one in which we
live today. Professor Horwitz may well be right that most of today's univer-
sities, even if granted deference on legal questions, "would still observe most
of the civic norms ... that are usually enforced through the law."' 55 But why
leave that to chance? Why undermine the courts' role in our delicate consti-
tutional balance and leave university officials to judge their own actions?
Why take the often-neglected risk of history repeating itself? 56 Whatever the
benefits of according deference to educational institutions, they are vastly
outweighed by the potential risk of serious abuse. As Justice Thomas put it in
a later decision:
Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred
Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will be
151. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
152. Id. at 299.
153. For a discussion of the immediate aftermath of Brown I and Brown II, see
generally Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: " A Study of School Dese-
gregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956).
154. Parker, supra note 107, at 1707-08 & n.89.
155. Horwitz, supra note 126, at 1543.
156. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
racial discrimination in higher-education institutions).
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nothing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am
unwilling to take and it is one the Constitution does not allow.' 57
C. Grutter's Deference Cannot Be Justified on
First Amendment Grounds
The Grutter Court found a home in the First Amendment for its defe-
rence to the law school on its race-conscious admissions policy.' The Court
noted that "given the important purpose of public education and the expan-
sive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environ-
ment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."' 59
This First Amendment interest, in turn, required the Court to defer to a
higher-education institution's admissions policies, including the use of race to
promote diversity.
What in the First Amendment's text or the Court's First Amendment ju-
risprudence accords a special constitutional status to higher-education institu-
tions? What in the First Amendment protects a university's decision of
whom to admit to its student body? Scholars have debated these questions at
length, 1o so this section provides only a brief overview. This section then
poses a question that the Grutter Court failed to confront: Even assuming that
a school's admissions policy enjoys First Amendment protection, can that
First Amendment interest trump an individual's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to be subject to racial discrimination?
The recognition of educational autonomy under the First Amendment
can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire.161 In that case, the Court invalidated the conviction of Paul Sweezy,
157. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
781-82 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that universities enjoy
"educational autonomy" that is "grounded in the First Amendment").
159. Id
160. For a thorough analysis of the origins of academic freedom under the First
Amendment, see Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 481-
502 (2005). For a criticism of a First Amendment right to academic freedom, see
William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 220-24, 230-33 (1999) (asserting that
"the impressive rhetoric about academic freedom" in Supreme Court opinions "was
sweepingly proclaimed rather than carefully delineated"); Robert A. Caplen, The
"Fifth" Freedom: Freedom from Impermissible Expansion of Academic Freedom to
University Admissions, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard H. Hiers, Institutional
Academic Freedom or Autonomy Grounded upon the First Amendment: A Jurispru-
dential Mirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never
actually held that academic institutions are entitled to either academic freedom or
autonomy under the First Amendment.").
161. 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957) (plurality opinion); Horwitz, supra note 160, at
482.
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who was convicted on the basis of several Marxist lectures he gave at the
University of New Hampshire.162 In dictum, the Court recognized a First
Amendment interest against the restriction of speech in an academic con-
text.163 Of course, this interest is not limited to higher-education institutions
or to academic speech. Any person - whether on or off campus - enjoys a
First Amendment right, subject to certain exceptions, to engage in speech
activities, join organizations, or deliver lectures, and do so without the fear of
criminal liability.
Over time, this tenuously grounded First Amendment interest in aca-
demic speech expanded further than its roots. In Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of the State of New York, the Supreme Court struck
down a New York law making membership in the Communist Party prima
facie evidence of disqualification for employment in the public school sys-
tem. The Court held that the law was overbroad under the First Amend-
ment because the law denied employment even to those persons who joined
the Communist Party with no intent to further that party's unlawful aims.166
In what was otherwise a narrow holding based on overbreadth,16 the Court
broadly declared that a classroom serves as a "marketplace of ideas" and that
the nation's future leaders are "trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange . . . which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues . ... 168
Keyishian's focus on universities' role in the development of future leaders
signaled a shift towards deference to a university's institutional policies, in-
cluding the selection of its student body, even though Keyishian itself had
nothing to do with admissions policies.
Justice Powell recognized this extension in his opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke: "The freedom of a university to make its
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."1 69
But why does a university's admissions policy constitute academic speech
protected under the First Amendment? Does a university engage in protected
speech when it decides whom to admit? Perhaps, as the Keyishian Court
162. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 244-46.
163. Id. at 250 (noting in dictum that the First Amendment protects academic
speech because "[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust").
164. According to William Buss, the Supreme Court's rhetoric about freedom of
academic speech is based - not on the freedom to teach - but on "the extramural free-
dom to participate as citizens in the political process by joining organizations or en-
gaging in speech activities outside the classroom." Buss, supra note 160, at 222-23.
165. 385 U.S. 589, 605-11 (1967).
166. Id. at 609-11.
167. See Buss, supra note 160, at 223 (noting that Keyishian's "narrow holding
... was based on vagueness and overbreadth").
168. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); Horwitz, supra note 160, at 488.
169. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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noted, the university facilitates the creation of a "marketplace of ideas" in the
classroom by admitting a diverse student body. 170 That admissions decision,
in turn, may be protected by the First Amendment.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the First Amendment protects a
university's admissions decisions. There is another hurdle that Justice Powell
in Bakke had acknowledged, but that the Grutter Court failed to overcome.
Justice Powell, in recognizing a First Amendment interest in a university's
selection of its student body, noted that a university's educational decisions
are subject to "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights."l 71
Surely, the right to be free from racial discrimination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is an individual right that should trump any institutional autono-
my or educational freedom that the First Amendment protects.
Contrast Grutter to other cases where individual constitutional rights
trumped a higher-education institution's educational autonomy. For example,
in Saxe v. State College Area School District, the Third Circuit - in an opi-
nion authored by then-Judge Alito - struck down a university's anti-
harassment policy as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amend-
ment.172 The Third Circuit's opinion did not even hint at deference to the
university's educational judgment under the First Amendment, even though
the university's policy, much like the law school's policy in Grutter, was
adopted to preserve order and provide a "nurturing school environment." 73
The students' First Amendment rights to free speech trumped whatever insti-
tutional autonomy that the university enjoyed.
Likewise, in Doe v. University of Michigan, the district court struck
down under the First Amendment an anti-harassment policy that the Universi-
ty of Michigan adopted in response to rising incidents of racism.174 The court
did not defer to the University of Michigan's educational judgment in adopt-
ing this policy, even though the very same university's law school was
granted the educational autonomy to use race in its admissions decisions in
Grutter.175 If the First Amendment rights of students trump a university's
educational autonomy, so must the Fourteenth Amendment rights of students
to be free from discrimination because of their race.
170. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
171. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
172. 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001); see Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring:
Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation Cases, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 496
& n.127 (2009).
173. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 202.
174. 721 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see Moran, supra note 172, at
496 & n.127.
175. See Moran, supra note 172, at 496 ("Judges generally have rejected 'hate
speech' codes adopted to protect students from 'words that wound' because these
measures chill the legitimate discussion of racial difference and curtail individual
rights of expression.").
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There is yet another reason why a First Amendment interest in educa-
tional freedom has to give way to liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after the First
Amendment. The First Amendment could not have created an educational-
autonomy exception in a constitutional provision that did not exist at the time
of its adoption. Where there is a conflict between two constitutional provi-
sions, the one enacted later in time controls.176 If the First Amendment re-
cognizes an interest in educational freedom, that interest therefore is subject
to any limitations the Fourteenth Amendment subsequently imposed. For that
reason, what several commentators have labeled as the First Amendment
"educational benefits" exception to the Fourteenth Amendment is a misno-
mer.177 If anything, the Fourteenth Amendment creates an exception to the
institutional autonomy of universities under the First Amendment. This ex-
ception prevents higher-education institutions from using their autonomy to
discriminate on the basis of race. Because the Fourteenth Amendment,
through the Equal Protection Clause, protects the right to be free from racial
discrimination, deference to the law school's use of race in its admissions
decisions in Grutter cannot be justified under the First Amendment.
D. Grutter's Deference Lacks Support from Precedent
In support of its deference to the law school, the Grutter Court relied on
three prior Supreme Court cases: Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing,178 a footnote from Justice Powell's concurrence in Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,179 and a footnote from Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Bakke. 80 The first two cases, Ewing and Horowitz, are dis-
tinguishable from Grutter because they accorded deference to university offi-
cials under rational-basis review, not strict scrutiny. Under the deferential
rational-basis test, "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."' 8 1
176. See Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 300 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002)
("[I]t is a firmly established rule of constitutional jurisprudence that where two consti-
tutional provisions conflict, the one that was enacted later in time controls." (citation
omitted)); Premier Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970, 972 (E.D. Pa.
1935) ("[Constitutional] provisions, if conflicting, are subject to the rule applied to
conflicting statutes. The latest controls.").
177. See Beard, supra note 107, at 4-5 (noting that Gruner created an "education-
al benefits" exception "to the guarantee of racial equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment").
178. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
179. 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
180. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978).
181. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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In Ewing, a University of Michigan student claimed that the university
violated his due-process rights by dismissing him for poor academic perfor-
mance.182 The Court rejected this claim and concluded, in part by deferring
to university officials, that the dismissal was not arbitrary or capricious.
Because there was no suspect classification at issue, rational-basis review, not
strict scrutiny, applied. Importantly, the Court's deference was to the educa-
tional judgment of the university officials on "the substance of a genuinely
academic decision" 84 - i.e., the "'academic performance of students and their
entitlement to promotion or graduation.' 185 Despite deferring to the univer-
sity, the Court also examined the record, noting that the district court had
found that the university "'had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the pro-
gram,"' namely, his poor academic performance.186 Even though one might
argue that the law school's implementation of an admissions policy is no
different than the university's decision to dismiss Ewing, the crucial differ-
ence between the two cases is the application of strict scrutiny in Grutter and
rational basis in Ewing.187 While deference is permissible under the latter, it
is inconsistent with the former.
Similarly, in Horowitz, the Court, applying rational-basis review, re-
jected the due-process claims of a medical student dismissed for poor aca-
demic performance. The Court applied the balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridgel8 and concluded that the procedures used in dismissing Horowitz
were sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 190 Although the majority
noted that public education is committed to state and local authorities and
judicial intervention in public education requires "'care and restraint,"' it
never expressly mentioned deference to the educational institution.191
Indeed, the Grutter Court cited, not the majority opinion in Horowitz,
but a footnote from Justice Powell's concurrence to support its deference to
182. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222-23.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 225.
185. Id. at 225 n.1 1 (quoting Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring)). Decisions about the "academic performance
of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation," Horowitz, 435 U.S. at
96 n.6, are inherently educational judgments, similar to the business decisions that a
board of directors makes in managing a corporation. See supra text accompanying
notes 109-11 (discussing the business-judgment rule).
186. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227 (quoting the district-court decision).
187. See Buss, supra note 160, at 232 (characterizing Ewing as "a garden-variety
deference of the judiciary to an institutional decision to dismiss a student for failing to
meet academic standards").
188. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80-81, 91-92.
189. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
190. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85.
191. Id. at 91 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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the law school. 192 The footnote addressed the discretion given to university
officials in decisions concerning the "academic performance of students and
their entitlement to promotion or graduation,"193 which was the same type of
deference at issue in Ewing under rational-basis review (not strict scrutiny).
And even in Ewing and Horowitz, where a deferential standard applied, the
deference accorded to the educational institution was not tantamount to a
carte blanche to violate the Constitution. Had the educational institution pro-
vided no meaningful process to the student (e.g., dismissed the student after
flipping a coin), the Court in both cases would have found a due-process vi-
olation.
As the final support for its deference to the law school, the Grutter
Court cited a footnote from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.194 That foot-
note stated:
Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which eth-
nic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and
legitimate educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds
on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for
* * *195judicial interference in the academic process.
Even though this footnote certainly provides support for the Grutter ma-
jority, it was anything but clear before Grutter that Justice Powell's statement
on this point was controlling. Bakke was a badly fractured decision and left
lower courts confused as to whether a majority of the Justices had signed on
to any portion of the opinion.196 It was not until Grutter that the Supreme
Court cited Justice Powell's opinion as controlling.197 As a result, this foot-
note provided little, if any, precedential support to the Grutter Court's con-
clusions.
192. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S.
at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring)).
193. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
194. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978)).
195. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
196. See United States v. Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he
Justices [in Bakke] have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree."), aff'd in
part, vacated in part on reh'g, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
197. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53).
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E. What Are the Limits to Grutter's Deference?
The Grutter Court stated at least three limitations to its deferential anal-
ysis. First, the Court limited its deference to institutions of higher education,
which "occupy a special niche" under the First Amendment.198 Second, the
Court's deference would be to an institution's "educational judgment." 99 If
the constitutional challenge is to a policy unrelated to the educational purpos-
es of the institution, then deference presumably would be improper. Third,
the Court noted that the law school's admissions criteria did not constitute a
quota system, reiterating Justice Powell's holding in Bakke that racial quotas
are unconstitutional.200
This narrow set of limitations leaves the door wide open to extend Grut-
ter's holding beyond its facts. Remaining within the bounds of higher educa-
tion, consider whether the Court would apply deference in the following hy-
pothetical. A traditionally African American university decides to diversify
its student body. The vast majority of its applicants are African American.
To achieve its compelling interest in diversity, it seeks to admit a "critical
mass" of Caucasian students, thereby precluding admission to some African
American applicants whom it would have admitted under its race-neutral
admissions policy. African American students who were denied admission
file suit, challenging the school's policy under the Equal Protection Clause.
What result? If the same strict-scrutiny test applies to classifications that seek
to include or exclude members of a particular race, as the Supreme Court has
201
repeatedly held, this hypothetical admissions policy would be just as de-
serving of deference as was the law school's policy in Grutter.
198. Id. at 329.
199. Id. at 328.
200. Id. at 335.
201. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 229-30 (1995)
("[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race,
that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification."); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-91 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and some-
thing else when applied to a person of another color."); see also Ricci v. DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) ("Whatever the City's ultimate aim - however well
intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed - the City made its employment deci-
sion because of race."). As the Court later explained in Parents Involved:
The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications are clear
enough. "The Court's emphasis on 'benign racial classifications' suggests
confidence in its ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental
uses of racial criteria. History should teach greater humility . . . .
'[B]enign' carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only ac-
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Even though the Grutter Court limited its holding to higher-education
institutions, was there a sound legal basis for doing so? This limitation was
based in part on the Court's assertion that universities are training grounds for
the nation's future leaders. This would limit the Court's deference to those
institutions that similarly train leaders. But it is not only higher-education
institutions that educate and produce leaders for the nation's future. Suppose
the U.S. Department of Justice forms a new division, which promises incom-
parable opportunities to bright law-school graduates, in part to prepare these
young lawyers for lucrative leadership positions in government. Would defe-
rence be proper to the Department of Justice's decision to facilitate diversity
in its new division by using race as a "plus" factor in making employment
offers? Ultimately, if the Court's basis for deference to the law school was
the facilitation of a marketplace of ideas in an institution that develops lead-
ers, the new division of the Department of Justice would be just as deserving
of deference.
In addition to deferring to universities because they are training grounds
for future leaders, the Court also reasoned that higher-education institutions
make "complex educational judgments" that lie beyond the competence of the
judiciary. 20 This argument would be equally applicable to many institutions
outside the higher-education context.203 The Department of Justice in the
above hypothetical and the City of New Haven Fire Department in Ricci also
make complex decisions related to that institution that are just as much, if not
more, beyond the competence of the judiciary as the educational judgments of
a university.204 After all, five justices on the current Court (Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) are former academics;205 the Court
ceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a politically accepta-
ble burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasona-
ble."
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007)
(quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 609-10 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
202. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
203. See Moss, supra note 130, at 6 (arguing that the reasons behind the academ-
ic-deference doctrine would require courts to "defer to employers in a wide swath of
labor markets, whenever judges feel insecure about their knowledge of the field").
204. See Horwitz, supra note 32, at 1090 ("[T]he federal courts regularly, and
without any hint of deference, review and resolve problems of the most exquisite
complexity."); id. at 1092 (noting, for example, that courts do not "show any special
degree of deference to decisions made by the aeronautics industry" even though
courts are unlikely to be familiar with that industry); Adam Winkler, The Federal
Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1931, 1958 (2007) ("Does [Grutter] mean that every governmental institution with a
mission and expertise is a special constitutional niche? If so, what remains of skep-
tical judicial review, and to exactly which governmental entities does it apply?").
205. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supreme
court.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
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undoubtedly knows more about running a higher-education institution than a
fire department or the Department of Justice. If such an entity decides to use
race as a factor in hiring decisions, what would justify distinguishing it from a
higher-education institution?206
These hypothetical slippery-slope scenarios have practical grounding.
At least one federal circuit court took Grutter's deference out of the campus
grounds and applied it to the employment context. In Petit v. City of Chica-
go, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a policy of the
Chicago Police Department that standardized the applicants' raw scores in
promotion examinations in a way that advantaged minorities.207 The purpose
of the policy was to create and maintain a diverse police department.2 0  In
support of its holding that the Chicago Police Department had a compelling
interest in diversity, the court expressly relied on Grutter and deferred to "the
views of experts and Chicago police executives that affirmative action was
warranted to enhance the operations" of the Department.209
Employers are not the only institutions that might benefit from Grutter's
deference. Scholars have argued for the extension of Grutter's deference to a
plethora of other organizations, including libraries, news organizations,
churches, and corporations.2 10 Given the lack of coherent boundaries to Grut-
206. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial
discrimination for the purpose of putting together a 'critical mass' that will convey
generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate -
indeed, particularly appropriate - for the civil service system of the State of Michigan
to do so.").
207. 352 F.3d 1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 2003). According to Cynthia Estlund, the
Grutter Court endorsed the "business case for diversity":
The proponents of workforce diversity will rightly take comfort in the ma-
jority's affirmation that student body diversity "better prepares students
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society," and in its reliance on
corporate amici's contention that "the skills needed in today's increasing-
ly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."
Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20 (2005) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
208. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114.
209. Id.; see also Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ. A. 04-6085 (JWB), 2005
WL 2077479, at *6-7 (D. N.J. Aug. 25, 2005) (applying Grutter to uphold the City of
Newark's race-conscious policy to diversify its firehouses), rev'd, 463 F.3d 303 (3d
Cir. 2006); Adams, supra note 114, at 980 ("Lower courts relied on Grutter's more
expansive vision of the governmental interest and its relaxed brand of narrow tailor-
ing, and imported those innovations outside of the higher education context.").
210. Elizabeth Dale, Death or Transformation? Educational Autonomy in the
Roberts Court, 43 TULSA L. REv. 725, 728 (2008); Horwitz, supra note 126, at 1502
("[A] number of other institutions - the press, religious associations, libraries, and
others . . . should enjoy substantial deference from courts . . . ."). In addition, a stu-
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ter's reasoning, the deference applied in that case is unlikely to remain within
the higher-education context.21
But at least one can take comfort in the certainty of one proposition for
which Grutter stands: Deferential review applies to equal-protection chal-
lenges to a higher-education institution's admissions policy. If context in-
deed matters under the Equal Protection Clause, one would at least expect the
Court to apply the same deferential analysis in the same context. Think
again.
IV. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA: No DEFERENCE TO ANOTHER
HIGHER-EDUCATION INSTITUTION
A. Background
United States v. Virginia concerned an equal-protection challenge by the
United States to the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military
Institute ("VMI"). 212 VMI, a public higher-education institution, provided
"incomparable" education to men and trained them to be "citizen-soldiers." 213
VMI used the "'adversative method"' of teaching, characteristic of traditional
military instruction, seeking to instill in students a strong moral code via
"'[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of
privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable val-
ues."' 14 VMI's unique educational method had proved to be rather fruitful;
members of Congress, military generals, and business executives were among
215its impressive list of alumni.
The district court applied intermediate scrutiny to VMI's single-sex pol-
icy and rejected the United States' equal-protection challenge.2 16 The court
found that the admission of women would necessitate fundamental changes in
VMI's distinct adversative method, which provided a "sufficient constitution-
al justification" for upholding its admissions policy.217
dent commentator has argued for the application of Grutter's deferential strict scruti-
ny to infringements on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. See
Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1570-73 (2009).
211. See Massey, supra note 101, at 970 (arguing that Grutter "distorted and wea-
kened the force of strict scrutiny in equal protection, and by implication, in other
areas of constitutional law in which strict scrutiny is applicable").
212. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
213. Id. at 519, 557.
214. Id at 520, 522 (quoting the district court's decision).
215. Id. at 520.
216. Id. at 523-24.
217. Id. at 524.
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218The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed2. The prof-
fered purpose of VMI's policy - the promotion of "autonomy and diversity" -
could not survive constitutional scrutiny because the policy favored one
gender while disadvantaging the other.219 But the Fourth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the admission of women would materially affect VMI's
training program and thus provided three options to the Commonwealth of
Virginia to remedy its constitutional violation: (1) establish a parallel institu-
tion for women; (2) allow the admission of women to VMI; or (3) withdraw
state support from VMI.220
The Commonwealth opted for the first option, proposing the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL").2 Yet VWIL was fundamen-
tally different from VMI because it lacked VMI's military model of educa-
tion, which the task force in charge of designing VWIL found to be unsuita-
ble for most women.222 Instead, VWIL implemented "'a cooperative method
[that] reinforces self-esteem."' 223 The district court held that the establish-
ment of VWIL satisfied the Commonwealth's obligations under the Equal
Protection Clause because VMI and VWIL would "'achieve substantially
similar outcomes."' 224 The Fourth Circuit later affirmed the district court's
decision, applying what the majority of the Supreme Court described as a
deferential analysis to the Commonwealth. 225
The Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision, reversed the Fourth Circuit.
The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, which governs classifications on the
basis of gender, and required the state to show: (1) an "'exceedingly persua-
sive justification"' for the single-sex policy and (2) the use of means '"sub-
227
stantially related to the achievement"' of that purpose. Under intermediate
218. Id.
219. Id. at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. at 525-26.
221. Id. at 526.
222. Id. at 526-27.
223. Id. at 527 (quoting the district court's decision).
224. Id. at 527-28 (quoting the district court's decision).
225. Id. at 528.
226. Id at 518, 534. Justice Thomas recused himself from participation in this
case. Id. at 558.
227. Id. at 531, 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)). The Court interchangeably referred to the requirement under the first prong
of this test as "important governmental objectives" and "exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication." See, e.g., id. at 533. Justice Scalia, dissenting, criticized the latter characte-
rization of the first prong, arguing that it amounted to strict scrutiny in disguise. Id. at
571-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
("While terms like 'important governmental objective' and 'substantially related' are
hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the
phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' That phrase is best confined, as it was
first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a
formulation of the test itself.").
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scrutiny, the state's proffered purpose had to be "genuine, not hypothesized
or invented post hoc in response to litigation," and the state could not "rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or prefe-
rences of males and females."22 8 The burden of meeting these requirements
was "demanding" and rested "entirely on the State."229
In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court first analyzed Virginia's
purported purposes for drawing a gender-based classification: (1) the provi-
sion of important educational benefits that inhere to single-sex education,
including the contribution of single-sex education to "diversity in educational
approaches" across the Commonwealth of Virginia and (2) the preservation
of VMI's adversative method, which VMI would have to modify if it admit-
ted women.230 Responding to these purposes, the Court refused to defer to
VMI's first asserted interest in diversity, holding that VMI failed to establish
that the exclusion of women diversified educational opportunities in Virgin-
ia.231 The Court emphasized that VMI's justification would "not be accepted
automatically" and engaged in an exacting inquiry into whether VMI's prof-
fered interest in diversity had any substance. Examining in detail the histo-
ry of VMI, its internal reports, the history of other higher-education institu-
tions in Virginia, and the testimony from the record, the Court found "no
persuasive evidence . . . that VMI's male-only admission policy is in further-
ance of a stated policy of diversity." 233
Next, the Supreme Court analyzed VMI's second assertion that the ad-
234
mission of women would "destroy" its unique educational method. The
district court had found that "coeducation would materially affect 'at least
these three aspects of VMI's program - physical training, the absence of pri-
vacy, and the adversative approach."' 235 The Supreme Court refused to defer
to VMI's proffered interest in maintaining its unique training method and also
rejected the district court's findings of fact. It held that these findings
amounted to unacceptable, overbroad generalizations and "'fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' 236 Citing historical
evidence such as the successful admission of women into the military, the
Court noted that "Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly
grounded."237 The Court therefore concluded that Virginia failed to establish
228. Id at 533 (majority opinion).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 534-35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id. at 535.
232. Id. at 535-36 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13 (1977)).
233. Id. at 535-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id. at 540.
235. Id. at 540-41 (quoting the district court's opinion).
236. Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982)).
237. Id. at 544-45.
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an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's male-only admissions
*238
policy.
Finally, the Court examined VWL, Virginia's proposed women-only
counterpart to VMI. The Court held that "VWIL [did] not qualify as VMI's
equal" because "VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings, and facili-
ties" did not match VMI's.239 Moreover, VWIL graduates could not "antic-
ipate the benefits associated with VMI's 157-year history, the school's pres-
tige, and its influential alumni network."240 The Court went on to criticize the
Fourth Circuit's deferential review to Virginia's proposal of VWJL, noting
that deference is "inconsistent with the more exacting standard our precedent
requires." 241 The Court stated that the Fourth Circuit's deferential approach
yielded "little or no scrutiny of the effect of a classification directed at [sin-
gle-gender education]."242 Giving no deference to Virginia, the Court held
that VMI's male-only admissions policy failed intermediate scrutiny and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 43
B. Similarities Between Grutter and Virginia
The similarities between Grutter and Virginia are striking. First, both
cases concerned admission to elite institutions of higher leaming. The Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School was "among the Nation's top law
schools,"244 and VMI was an "incomparable military college" with over-
whelming alumni support and success at producing leaders.245
Second, the challenges in both cases concerned the institutions' "educa-
tional judgment," which, under Grutter's reasoning, would deserve deference
under the First Amendment. Specifically, the educational judgment at issue
in both cases was the adoption of an admissions policy. As Justice Powell
noted in his opinion in Bakke - which the Grutter Court accepted as control-
ling - a university must be allowed "to make its own judgments as to educa-
tion[,] includ[ing] the selection of its student body."24 6
Third, both the law school and VMI offered the same objective for
drawing protected classifications in their admissions policies: the achieve-
ment of diversity. VMI argued that diversity is an important governmental
objective and that single-sex schools can contribute to the attainment of di-
versity by "'dissipat[ing], rather than perpetuat[ing], traditional gender classi-
238. Id. at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Id. at 551.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 555.
242. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id. at 519.
244. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312 (2003).
245. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519.
246. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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fications."' 2 47 Likewise, the law school offered, and the Grutter Court ac-
cepted via deference, a compelling interest in the achievement of diversity
through the enrollment of a critical mass of minority students.248 If diversity
is a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, it follows, afortiori, that it is an
249
important interest under the less exacting intermediate-scrutiny test.
But rather than deferring to VMI's assertion that its interest in diversity
was an important state interest - as did the Grutter Court - the Virginia Court
held, after a meticulous analysis, that VMI's male-only admissions policy did
not further its asserted diversity interest.250 In contrast, the Grutter Court
failed to scrutinize whether the law school's stated interest in diversity was
the actual purpose behind its race-conscious admissions policy.25 Even
though strict scrutiny is a more exacting test than intermediate scrutiny, the
Virginia Court engaged in a more exacting analysis under intermediate scru-
tiny than did the Grutter Court under strict scrutiny.
Fourth, both VMI and the law school asserted that interference by the
Court with their admissions policies would sacrifice the educational benefits
provided by each institution. VMI asserted that the admission of women
would require a dramatic sacrifice of the adversative method and the academ-
ic experience of its students. 252 Indeed, the district court in VMI made a fact
finding that, were women admitted, "'some aspects of [VMI's] distinctive
method would be altered"' 253 and VMI "'would eventually find it necessary
to drop the adversative system altogether."' 254 But the Court refused to defer
to VMI's educational judgment and held that VMI could alter its educational
policy to allow the admission of women without foregoing its adversative
education method.255
Like VMI, the law school maintained that a race-neutral admissions pol-
icy would "reduce 'academic selectivity"' and turn the law school into "'a
very different institution"' by forcing it "'to sacrifice a core part of its educa-
247. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 n.7 (quoting Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women's
Colleges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *5, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos.
94-1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL 702837).
248. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
249. Even though both VMI and the law school asserted that "diversity" was the
purpose of their admissions policies, the diversity each sought to achieve was differ-
ent in kind. See infra Part IV.C.
250. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539-40.
251. See supra Part I.A.I.
252. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
253. Id (quoting the district-court opinion). That only some aspects of VMI's
distinctive training method would be altered does not distinguish that case from Grut-
ter. Adoption of race-neutral criteria likewise would have affected only some aspects
of the law school's educational policy - namely, the retention of its elite status.
254. Id. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the district-court opinion).
255. Id. at 551 n.19 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 751280
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/4
2010] STRICT IN THEORY, BUTACCOMMODATING IN FACT? 1281
tional mission."' 256 The Grutter majority concluded, by deferring to the law
school, that a race-neutral admissions policy would necessitate a "dramatic
sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or
both."257 The Court did not cite any evidence in the record for this proposi-
tion and dismissed in one paragraph the race-neutral methods that the district
court had found the law school failed to consider.258 Rather, the Grutter
Court took the law school "at its word" that it would implement a race-neutral
policy as soon as it found one that would not require fundamental changes in
the school's prestigious status.259
C. Can the Diferent Outcomes in Grutter and Virginia Be Justified?
Given the similarities between Grutter and Virginia, what justified the
use of deference in Grutter but its rejection in Virginia? There are three po-
tentially material differences between the two cases. First, the gender-based
discrimination in Virginia excluded women, but the race-conscious admis-
sions policy in Grutter included a critical mass of minority students. Perhaps
the Court in both cases was attempting to facilitate the admission of underre-
presented students to elite educational institutions and ensure their inclusion
among the leaders that both institutions produce. But the Court has consis-
tently held that heightened scrutiny applies to all protected classifications,
whether they seek to include or exclude a protected class.260 Under this
precedent, the same test would apply regardless whether the law school in
Grutter sought to include or exclude minority students and regardless whether
VMI sought to include or exclude women.
Second, the difference in the applicable test of constitutionality also
does not explain the difference between the cases. The Virginia Court ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny, requiring the state to show an "'important"' or
"'exceedingly persuasive' objective and means substantially related to the
achievement of that objective. In contrast, the Grutter Court applied strict
scrutiny, requiring the state to show a "compelling interest" and narrowly
262
tailored means to achieve that interest. Because strict scrutiny imposes a
burden more difficult to meet than intermediate scrutiny, the non-deferential
256. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 69, at *33-36).
257. Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 343. Deference to the law school on this point was critical to the
Court's decision because, according to the Court, "race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time" to be constitutional. Id. at 342.
260. See supra note 201 and authorities cited therein.
261. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1993)).
262. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-28.
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approach in Virginia cannot be reconciled on this basis with the Grutter
Court's deferential analysis.
Third, even though both VMI and the University of Michigan Law
School asserted an interest in diversity, the diversity each sought to achieve
was different in kind. The law school sought to include "a critical mass" of
263
minority students within its own student body. In contrast, VMI did not
seek to diversify its own student body. Rather, its interest was in offering
single-sex education as an alternative to the co-educational institutions in
Virginia, thereby contributing to the diversity of the schools in the entire
state.264 Even though universities enjoy educational autonomy under the First
Amendment, that autonomy applies to decisions universities make with re-
spect to their own policies. A broader diversity interest among all education-
al institutions in Virginia may not fall within the ambit of the autonomy ac-
corded to higher-education institutions.
Even assuming that the disparity between the diversity interests in Vir-
ginia and Grutter was material, VMI's second proffered interest - the preser-
vation of its unique adversative educational method265 - related directly to its
own institutional autonomy. This asserted interest has no meaningful legal
difference from the law school's proffered interest in the diversity of its stu-
dent body. But the Virginia Court never mentioned the educational autonomy
that a higher-education institution enjoys under the First Amendment; indeed,
the First Amendment is mentioned nowhere in the opinion.
The diversity interests in Virginia and Grutter were different in another
respect. VMI's interest in educational diversity benefited only males because
no women-only public institution of VMI's caliber existed in Virginia. 266In
contrast, the diversity interest of the law school in Grutter may have bene-
fited all students, not just racial minorities. Racial minorities benefited from
the law school's admissions criteria because, with race considered as a plus
factor, they had a better chance of admission to the law school. In addition,
the rest of the student body also may have benefited from the law school's
admissions policy because they were exposed to different viewpoints and
better trained for a diverse society and workforce than they may have been if
the law school employed a race-neutral admissions policy.267 But the law
school's policy harmed those applicants who would have been admitted to the
law school had a race-neutral admissions policy been in place. Thus, even
though the law school's policy may have benefited all enrolled minority and
non-minority students, it still harmed - similar to VMI's policy - a class of
applicants solely because of their race.
Ultimately, there is no meaningful way to reconcile the Court's deci-
sions in Grutter and Virginia. The only substantive difference between the
263. Id. at 316.
264. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534-35.
265. Id. at 540.
266. Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
267. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33.
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two cases seems to be that the classification in Grutter was "benign," 268 whe-
reas the classification in Virginia was "discriminatory." 269 As stated above,
however, such distinction lacks any constitutional significance under current
Supreme Court case law because the same heightened scrutiny applies to both
classifications. Thus, had Grutter been decided before Virginia, and had the
Virginia Court been faithful to Grutter's reasoning, VMI would still be refus-
ing admission to qualified women.
Although Virginia and Grutter concerned higher-education institutions,
in cases decided thereafter, the Supreme Court considered the application of
deferential scrutiny in two other contexts: prisons and K-12 schools. As the
next two sections analyze these cases and dig deeper into the Court's equal-
protection jurisprudence, even more inconsistencies are unraveled in the
Court's evolving application of deferential scrutiny.
V. JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA: No DEFERENCE TO PRISON
ADMINISTRATORS
In Grutter, the Supreme Court held that it would defer to a higher-
education institution in its decision to use race as a factor in making admis-
270
sions decisions. What if the institution were a prison facility instead of a
law school? If the prison segregated inmates according to their race to pre-
vent violence, would the Court accord to prison administrators the same defe-
rence that it gave to law-school admissions officials in Grutter? Two years
after Grutter, the Court answered this question in Johnson v. California.
A. The Majority's Non-Deferential Analysis
Johnson v. California concerned an equal-protection challenge to the
California Department of Corrections' ("CDC") policy of racially segregating
prisoners for up to sixty days upon admittance to a correctional facility.2
While other factors played a role in the cell-assignment process, race was the
predominant factor. Numerous incidents of race-based violence among
prisoners, most of whom belonged to violent gangs, required this policy.2
California prison officials testified that racial conflict and violence were cer-
268. Id. at 326.
269. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548-49.
270. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
271. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
272. Id. at 502.
273. Id. In addition to race, the prison officials also considered "geographic and
national origin . . . age, mental health, medical needs, criminal history, and gang affil-
iation." Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 502-03 (majority opinion); see also id. at 526-27 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
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tain to result if prisoners were not segregated according to their race.275 Se-
gregation was limited to the cells in the initial reception areas, and the rest of
the prison facilities remained fully integrated.276
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor - the author of Grutter - the Su-
preme Court applied strict scrutiny to the prison policy.277 Justice O'Connor
reaffirmed that strict scrutiny governed all racial classifications, whether be-
27
nign or discriminatory278 and whether or not they "'may be said to burden or
benefit the races equally."' 279 The Court reasoned that a "'searching judicial
inquiry"' was necessary to determine 'what classifications are in fact moti-
vated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."'280
Previously, the Court had applied a deferential standard of review to prison
officials in Turner v. Safley, which challenged a prison regulation that re-
stricted the inmates' right to marry and correspond with other inmates.28 1
Under Turner, a prison policy that burdened the inmates' constitutional rights
would be upheld if the policy was "'reasonably related' to 'legitimate peno-
logical interests"' - similar to rational-basis review.282 But the Court con-
cluded that Turner's deferential standard of review did not apply to this case
because a suspect classification, race, was at issue. 283
The prison officials asked the Court to defer to them on the legality of
their segregation policy. 284 After all, these officials had special expertise in
managing prison operations, just as the university officials in Grutter had
285
special expertise in managing law schools. The Court declined. With no
mention of Grutter, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had "refused to
defer to state officials' judgments on race in other areas where those officials
traditionally exercise substantial discretion."286 According to the Court, defe-
rence to the state prison officials would reduce constitutional protections to a
nullity.287
275. Id. at 502-03 (majority opinion).
276. Id. at 503.
277. Id. at 505-06.
278. Id. at 505.
279. Id. at 506 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651 (1993)).
280. Id. at 505-06 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
281. Id. at 509-10 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
282. Id (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
283. Id. at 510.
284. Id. at 509.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 512 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-96 (1986); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
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In dissent, Justice Thomas argued for deference to state prison offi-
288
cials. But Justice O'Connor rejected that approach. She asserted that a
"hands-off approach to racial classifications" is "fundamentally at odds with
[the Court's] equal protection jurisprudence."2 89 Under the Court's jurispru-
dence, the burden was on the "state actors to demonstrate that their race-
based policies [were] justified,"290 and the deferential Turner standard would
be "too lenient . .. to ferret out invidious uses of race."291 According to Jus-
tice O'Connor, Turner would allow prisons to draw racial classifications even
when race-neutral methods existed to accomplish the same purpose.292 Under
Turner's deferential review, the Court would have to defer to simple asser-
tions by rison officials that racial segregation was necessary to prison man-
agement. 93 This the Court would not do.
Justice O'Connor's rejection of deference in Johnson was unequivocal.
Deference, according to Justice O'Connor, was "fundamentally at odds" with
the Court's equal-protection jurisprudence and strict scrutiny would apply in
every context.294 Justice O'Connor's absolute and categorical rejection of
deference was out of step with her acceptance of deference in the higher-
295
education context just two terms earlier in Grutter. With this unyielding
language, Justice O'Connor seemed to be backpedaling from her contextual
approach to strict scrutiny to a categorical one. Was she trying to send a sig-
nal? Had her broad rhetoric about deference in Grutter been taken too far?
B. The Dissent's Deferential Analysis
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented and contended that
the deferential standard from Turner should apply.296 Reminiscent of the
Grutter majority's deference to the law school on its race-conscious admis-
sions policy, Justice Thomas argued that judgments about race-based prison
policies "are better left in the first instance to the officials who run our Na-
tion's prisons, not to the judges who run its courts."297
Justice Thomas provided three reasons in support of his deferential ap-
proach. First, federal courts had traditionally deferred to prison officials on
matters concerning the administration of state prisons.29 8 Second, incarce-
288. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra Part V.B (discussing the
dissent's deferential analysis).
289. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 n.1.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 513.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 514.
294. Id. at 505, 506 & n.1.
295. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
296. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 542.
298. Id. at 528.
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rated persons did not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights as other
persons.299 And third, federal courts were ill-equipped "to supervise the daily
operations of prisons." 300 The challengers therefore had to make a "compel-
ling showing . . . to overcome the deference" given to prison officials. 30 1
Justice Thomas applied a deferential analysis in the prison context even
though, in a concurrence two years later in Parents Involved, he would state
that "as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking - regard-
less of context - is unconstitutional."30
Turning to the merits, the dissent would uphold the policy under Turn-
er's deferential standard.303 The record supported the prison officials' belief
that racial integration in the reception centers would lead to "serious vi-
olence."304 This interest in protecting inmates from gang violence, according
to the dissent, constituted a "legitimate penological interest."305 Further, Cal-
ifornia's racial-segregation policy bore a rational relationship to this penolog-
ical interest, because the use of race was inevitable in a prison system where
most prisoners were members of gangs that divided themselves along racial
lines. 0 The challengers had not shown any "'obvious, easy alternatives"' to
the racial-segregation policy. 307 Finally, the segregation policy applied only
at reception centers, and the rest of the prison areas were fully integrated.
Thus, according to the dissent, the policy survived the deferential Turner
standard.
C. The Majority's Non-Deferential Analysis Is
Inconsistent with Grutter
The majority in Johnson was correct to apply strict scrutiny. At issue
was a racial classification on the face of a government-sponsored policy. But
the Court's deference to the law school in Grutter cannot be reconciled with
its refusal to defer to the prison officials in Johnson. The Johnson Court's
analysis proceeded on the assumption that the applicable test was either strict
299. Id. Some exceptions to this rule include the right to due process and the right
to free exercise of religion. Id. at 528-29.
300. Id. at 529-30.
301. Id. at 543.
302. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
303. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 534 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 532-34, 537.
305. Id. at 534-35.
306. Id. at 535.
307. Id. at 537 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
308. Id. at 536.
[Vol. 751286
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/4
2010] STRICT IN THEORY, BUTACCOMMODATING IN FACT? 1287
scrutiny or the deferential Turner standard.30 The Court did not consider
that it had endorsed the possibility of combining deference with strict scrutiny
in Grutter. The Court could have held that strict scrutiny was the correct
standard and could have deferred, as in Grutter, to the judgment of the prison
authorities on whether preventing prison violence was a compelling interest
and whether segregating inmates according to their race at the reception cen-
ters was narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.
The Johnson majority did not explain why Grutter was distinguisha-
ble.310 Both cases addressed an equal-protection challenge to a policy that
drew a racial classification on its face. Both cases also involved institutions
that make complex judgments in which federal courts are ostensibly ill-
advised to intervene. What justified, then, the Court's deference to the law
school in Grutter but the application of non-deferential strict scrutiny in
Johnson? If, as the Johnson Court noted, "deference is fundamentally at odds
with [the Court's] equal-protection jurisprudence," 312 why was deference
acceptable two terms before in Grutter? Why would the use of race under-
mine "public respect for our system of [criminal] justice"313 but not public
respect for our education system? The Johnson majority held that the defe-
rential Turner standard was inapplicable, carving an exception to the applica-
bility of that standard to prison policies that draw racial classifications. 14 If
deference should not be accorded to prison authorities on policies that draw
classifications based on race, why must the Court defer to higher-education
institutions on all educational policies - even when they draw racial classifi-
cations?
One factor could potentially distinguish Grutter from Johnson. In Grut-
ter, race was considered a "plus factor" among other factors in deciding
whom to admit to the law school.315 In contrast, race was the predominant
factor in segregating inmates in Johnson. But this difference between Grutter
and Johnson is likely to be material only when the Court reaches the narrow-
tailoring analysis on the merits of the case. That is, the use of race as the
predominant factor (as opposed to one factor among many) is less likely to be
309. Id. at 509 (majority opinion) ("The CDC invites us to make an exception to
the rule that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, and instead to apply the
deferential standard of review articulated in Turner. . . ." (emphasis added)).
310. See id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Deference would seem all the more
warranted in the prison context, for whatever the Court knows of administering edu-
cational institutions, it knows much less about administering penal ones.").
311. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that the decision
of whom to admit to a university requires "complex educational judgments . . . pri-
marily within the expertise of the university"); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987) (establishing a rule of deference to prison administrators).
312. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 n.1.
313. Id. at 511.
314. Id. at 509-13.
315. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling interest and thus more likely to
be unconstitutional. This difference is not relevant, however, to determine
what test to apply to the policy - a question that the Court must decide before
it proceeds to the merits of the case.
The Johnson Court's non-deferential analysis cannot be reconciled with
Grutter's deferential analysis. The Court's decisions in Johnson and Grutter
seem to recognize two different types of strict scrutiny: deferential strict scru-
tiny (Grutter), and non-deferential or run-of-the-mill strict scrutiny (John-
son). Which type of strict scrutiny would apply to a school district's use of
race to facilitate diversity among students in K-12 schools? Before the Su-
preme Court's 2007 decision in Parents Involved, the answer to this question
was anybody's guess.
VI. PARENTS INVOL VED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V.
SEA TTLE SCHOOL DiSTRICTNO. 1: DEFERENCE TO K- 12 SCHOOLS?
Two school districts - one in Seattle, Washington and the other in Jef-
ferson County, Kentucky - voluntarily adopted student-assignment plans that
relied on racial categories, such as "black," "white," and "nonwhite," to de-
termine which public schools students may attend. 1 The Parents Involved
case concerned a challen e under the Equal Protection Clause to these race-
based assignment plans.
The Ninth Circuit, which considered the Seattle plan, applied deferential
strict scrutiny and upheld the plan as constitutional.3  Relying primarily on
Grutter, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Seattle has a compelling interest in
attaining the educational and social benefits of racial diversity and in prevent-
ing racial isolation and concentration in its schools.3 19 The Ninth Circuit
further concluded that Seattle's assignment plan was narrowly tailored to
serve its compelling interest in diversity.320 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
deferred to the Seattle school district under Grutter, reasoning that secondary
schools, like higher-education institutions, "occupy a unique position in our
constitutional tradition." 321 Evidencing the confusion that Grutter generated
in the lower courts,322 the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions ap-
plied three different tests of constitutional review: deferential strict scrutiny
316. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
709-10 (2007).
317. Id. at 710-11.
318. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1180.
321. Id. at 1188 n.33.
322. See also Fallon, supra note 1, at 1304 ("[U]ncertainty and confusion have
arisen about which version [of strict scrutiny] the Court will apply in cases in which
differences among the tests would result in different outcomes.").
[ Vol. 751288
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(majority);323 "robust and realistic rational basis" (concurrence);324 and tradi-
tional strict scrutiny (dissent).325
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, which considered the Jefferson
County plan, upheld that plan as constitutional in a short per curiam opinion
that affirmed the district court's reasoning.326 Relying on Grutter, the district
court held that Jefferson County had a compelling interest in maintaining
integrated schools and that its race-based assignment plan was narrowly tai-
lored to achieving that interest.327 The court underscored the "historical im-
portance of the deference accorded to local school boards" and noted that
such deference "goes to the very heart of our democratic form of govern-
ment." 328
These cases eventually made their way to the Supreme Court. 329In a
four-Justice plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, the Court reversed the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, holding that the school districts' race-based assignment plans vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause.330 Because the plans classified students
according to their race, the Court applied strict scrutiny.33 1 Under long-
standing precedent, the Court held that strict scrutiny was the controlling test
regardless whether the government's motives in drawing racial classifications
were benign or malicious.332 The Court would strike down the assignment
plans if they did not further a compelling interest or did not employ narrowly
tailored means to achieve that compelling interest. 333
On the compelling-interest prong, the plurality noted that, in the school
context, two interests had qualified as compelling in previous decisions:
(1) remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and (2) attaining
323. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1188 n.33.
324. Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that "robust and realistic ration-
al basis review" requires the courts to consider "the actual reasons for the plan in light
of the real-world circumstances that gave rise to it").
325. Id at 1199 (Bea, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority conceives of strict scrutiny
as some type of relaxed, deferential standard of review. I view it differently.").
326. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D.
Ky. 2004), aff'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
327. Id. at 850, 861-62.
328. Id. at 850.
329. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701.
330. Id at 708, 710-11.
331. Id at 720.
332. Id. at 741-42 (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We
have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial
classifications."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) ("Racial classifications are
suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot
suffice.")).
333. Id. at 720.
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diversity in higher-education institutions (which was recognized in Grut-
ter).334 The first interest was not at issue in either the Seattle or the Jefferson
County case. Seattle public schools never had been segregated by law.335
Although Jefferson County schools were once segregated by law and subject
to a desegregation decree, the decree had been dissolved in 2000 after the
district court found that Jefferson County had eliminated the vestiges asso-
ciated with its former segregation policy.336
As to the second government interest in diversity recognized in Grutter,
the plurality in Parents Involved concluded that this diversity interest did not
apply to elementary and secondary schools. 337 The plurality noted that, in
upholding diversity as a compelling interest, Grutter had relied upon consid-
erations unique to higher-education institutions - such as "the expansive free-
doms of speech and thought associated with the university environment" and
the "special niche" universities occupied "in our constitutional tradition."
These considerations, according to the plurality, were absent from K-12
schools. 339
But the plurality was unsuccessful in its attempt to nail the coffin shut
on Grutter and confine that case to higher-education institutions. Justice
Kennedy concurred separately to note his disagreement with the plurality's
analysis on this point. 40 Consistent with the views of the four dissenting
Justices,341 Justice Kennedy concluded that the diversity interest recognized
in Grutter may be, "depending on its meaning and definition," a compelling
interest for primary and secondary schools. 342
334. Id. at 720-22.
335. Id. at 720.
336. Id. at 720-21.
337. Id. at 724-25.
338. Id. at 724.
339. Id. at 724-25.
340. See id. at 783, 787-88, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
341. The dissenting Justices (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Souter) would extend Grutter to primary and secondary education:
In light of this Court's conclusions in Gruiter, the "compelling" nature of
these interests in the context of primary and secondary public education
follows here afortiori. Primary and secondary schools are where the edu-
cation of this Nation's children begins, where each of us begins to absorb
those values we carry with us to the end of our days.
Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The plurality, by contrast, does not
acknowledge that the school districts have identified a compelling interest here."); see
also id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A] district may consider it a compel-
ling interest to achieve a diverse student population."); id at 788 ("To the extent the
plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school au-
thorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view,
profoundly mistaken."). Justice Kennedy cautioned, however, that although race may
be one component of this diversity interest, "other demographic factors, plus special
1290 [Vol. 75
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On the narrowly tailored means prong, the plurality, joined by Justice
Kennedy, held that the race-based assignment plans were not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the school districts' stated interests. 343 The race-based classi-
fications shifted only a small number of students between schools and there-
fore had minimal effect on student assignments - suggesting that other means
would be just as, if not more, effective in achieving diversity. 344 Further, the
school districts had failed to show that they had seriously considered race-
neutral alternatives to achieve their stated goals.345 Unlike the Grutter Court,
which allowed the law school to reject race-neutral alternatives that might
sacrifice its elite status, the Parents Involved Court required the school dis-
tricts to give such alternatives serious consideration regardless of any unde-
sirable consequences.
In a portion of the opinion that Justice Kennedy did not join, the plurali-
ty rejected the dissent's pleas for deference to the school districts.346 Accord-
ing to the plurality, the "good faith" of the school districts did not suffice to
uphold their race-based assignment plans.347 In contrast to the plurality's
statement in Parents Involved, the majority in Grutter had expressly pre-
sumed "good faith" on the part of the law school "absent 'a showing to the
contrary."'
348
The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter, rejected the majority's application of strict scrutiny.349
Justice Breyer argued that a different standard of review should apply where,
as here, the government used race for beneficial rather than malignant pur-
poses. 350 According to Justice Breyer, the plans should be evaluated under a
"standard of review that is not 'strict' in the traditional sense of that word."35'
Under this diluted version of strict scrutiny, the government's race-conscious
actions would be upheld if the action "is proportionate to the important ends
it serves." 352 Justice Breyer's version of strict scrutiny seems to lie some-
where between the rational-basis test, which requires means rationally related
talents and needs, should also be considered." Id. at 798. A majority of lower court
opinions rendered during the three years following Parents Involved have treated
Justice Kennedy's concurrence on the diversity interest as binding precedent. See
generally Mary Kathryn Nagle, Parents Involved and the Myth of the Colorblind
Constitution, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 211 (2010).
343. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726, 733 (plurality opinion).
344. Id. at 733.
345. Id. at 735.
346. Id. at 744.
347. Id.
348. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)).
349. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 833-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 837.
352. Id.
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to legitimate ends, 353 and intermediate scrutiny, which requires means sub-
stantially related to the achievement of important ends.354 The dissent's defe-
rential strict-scrutiny test incorporates the means part of the rational-basis test
- "proportionate" or "rationally related" - and the ends part of the interme-
diate-scrutiny test - "important" interests. Justice Kennedy described the
dissent's standard of review as "permissive strict scrutiny," which he cau-
tioned "could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifi-
cations." 355
What was implicit in the Grutter majority thus became explicit in the
Parents Involved dissent. Although the Grutter Court repeatedly insisted that
its deferential analysis did not abandon strict scrutiny, s5 the Parents Involved
dissent pulled the last plug on strict scrutiny and confirmed what was appar-
ent from Grutter all along: Strict scrutiny, at least in some contexts, is strict in
theory, but accommodating in fact.
According to the Parents Involved dissent, deferential strict scrutiny was
the proper standard of review because "'[c]ontext matters."' 357 This does not
answer the question, but begs it. Why does context matter? Why is the gov-
ernment's use of race more legitimate in certain contexts than others? As the
dissent noted, the use of race-based criteria may arise in numerous contexts:
[C]ensus forms, research expenditures for diseases, assignments of
police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighbor-
hoods, efforts to desegregate racially segregated schools, policies
that favor minorities when distributing goods or services in short
supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral districts,
[and] peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the basis
358
of race.
In which of these contexts does diluted strict scrutiny apply? When
must lower courts apply run-of-the-mill strict scrutiny? Even within each
context, must the lower courts apply the same version of strict scrutiny - giv-
en that the Grutter Court deferred to a higher-education institution but the
Virginia Court did not? What about the Court's holding in Johnson v. Cali-
fornia just two terms earlier that the Court has "insisted on strict scrutiny in
every context"?359 Or the Court's holding in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peila that strict scrutiny applies to "all racial classifications" and by "any
353. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
354. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
355. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
356. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
357. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter,
539 U.S. at 326-27).
358. Id. at 834.
359. 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (emphasis added).
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governmental actor subject to the Constitution"? 360 Given the inconsistencies
in its application, has strict scrutiny become an "I know it when I see it"
test,361 which allows the Supreme Court to uphold those government actions
that the Court believes are beneficial and strike down those that the Court
believes are ill-advised? 362 Are the Supreme Court justices calling balls and
363
strikes with no indication to the pitcher of where the equal-protection strike
zone lies? These questions, and many others, abound.
A final important question remains. Does Justice Kennedy's acceptance
of diversity as a compelling interest for primary and secondary schools also
imply an agreement with the dissent's deferential strict-scrutiny test? Justice
Breyer certainly thinks so: "Apparently Justice Kennedy also agrees that [tra-
ditional] strict scrutiny would not apply in respect to certain 'race-conscious'
school board policies."3 M Further, Justice Kennedy refused to join the sec-
tion of the plurality opinion that criticized the dissent's deferential ap-
365
proach. This suggests that he disagreed with the plurality and agreed with
the dissent on the application of deferential strict scrutiny. Supporting this
view, Justice Kennedy's concurrence noted that "a school district, in its dis-
cretion and expertise, may choose to pursue" "a compelling interest . . . in
avoiding racial isolation." 66 Heeding a school district's "discretion and ex-
pertise" sounds remarkably like deferring to it.367
But in another part of his concurrence, Justice Kennedy criticized the
dissent's deferential strict-scrutiny test, noting that "[t]he dissent's permissive
strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis
360. 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (emphasis added).
361. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
362. Cass Sunstein has noted the dangers involved in abandoning the current
three-tier approach to constitutionality review under the Equal Protection Clause and
instead applying an ad hoc balancing test:
Without tiers, it would be difficult to predict judicial judgments under the
Equal Protection Clause, and judges would make decisions based on ad
hoc assessments of the equities. The Chancellor's foot is not a promising
basis for antidiscrimination law. . . . If the Court simply were to balance
all relevant factors in all equal protection cases, the rule of law would be
at excessive risk.
Sunstein, supra note 23, at 77-78.
363. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice
of the United States).
364. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 837
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 783, 788, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
366. Id. at 797.
367. See Adams, supra note 114, at 986-87 ("There are hints in the concurrence
that Justice Kennedy is deferring to the school districts on the issue of the importance
of racial diversity to primary and secondary education.").
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review) could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifi-
cations."368 This view is similar to his dissent in Grutter, where he broadly
proclaimed that "[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent
with it."369 But Justices do change their minds, and as Heather Gerken has
noted, Justice Kennedy significantly "softened his stance on race in Parents
Involved., 370 Given the mixed signals in Justice Kennedy's concurrence and
Justice Breyer's reading of it, the possibility remains that deferential strict
scrutiny garnered five votes in Parents Involved.
The fractured opinion in Parents Involved further muddied the waters in
the Court's application of strict scrutiny. Lower courts and school officials
alike are struggling to decipher the Court's split opinion and determine the
precedential value to accord to the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.3 7 1 But one thing is clear: Deferential strict scrutiny is alive and
well. It will be invoked again in future opinions and dissents in the Supreme
Court and in lower courts. What remains unclear is whether the deferential
strict-scrutiny test will assume a permanent spot among the tests that the Su-
preme Court uses to evaluate the constitutionality of government conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."372 With this re-
markable language, the Supreme Court ardently cautioned against the crea-
tion of uncertainty in the realm of fundamental rights and liberties. But un-
certainty now dominates the Supreme Court's application of the strict-
scrutiny test - a test that protects against governmental infringements on a
range of rights and liberties under the Constitution, including the right to
vote, the right to marry, the right to access the courts, freedom of speech, and
freedom of association.
368. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
369. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
370. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection,
121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (2007).
371. See Robert Barnes, Three Years After Landmark Court Decision, Louisville
Still Struggles with School Desegregation, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/19/
AR2010091904973.html?sid=ST2010091904357 ('Because [Parents Involved] is a
4-4-1 decision, we sit on a pinnacle, a question mark."' (quoting Sheldon Berman,
school Superintendent)); Nagle, supra note 342 (noting the disagreement among the
lower courts on whether the Parents Involved plurality's opinion or Justice Kennedy's
concurrence is binding precedent); see also Mark Bartholomew, Judicial Deference
and Sexual Discrimination in the University, 8 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 56, 78 (2000)
("Besides eroding public faith in the judicial process, the inconsistent application of
the deference doctrine also leaves administrators and faculty unclear on what speech
and conduct is legally permitted.").
372. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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The cases discussed in this Article might be a strong signal that the pen-
dulum of strict scrutiny is swinging from "fatal in fact" to "accommodating in
fact." Each move of that pendulum to the accommodating side of the line
threatens the protections that strict scrutiny was designed to afford. Each
inconsistent application of deferential and traditional strict scrutiny leaves
government actors uncertain about the constitutionality of their conduct and
lower courts asking themselves the nearly impossible question: "To defer or
not to defer?" By deferring on legal questions to the assertions of state actors
under the guise of strict scrutiny, the Court is handing its keys to the Consti-
tution to biased parties that appear before the Court. Our fundamental rights
and liberties will find no shelter within the inconsistent mix of deference and
strict scrutiny that the Court is slowly, but surely, endorsing.
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